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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of three essays analyzing the interplay between aging and the labor
market. The first chapter demonstrates that differential treatment by age exists in labor markets
and explores different possible explanations for this differential treatment. As the baby boom
cohort reaches retirement age, demographic pressures on public programs such as social security
may cause policy makers to cut benefits and encourage work at later ages. This chapter reports on
a labor market experiment to determine the hiring conditions for older women in entry-level jobs
in Boston, MA and St. Petersburg, FL. I find differential interviewing by age for these jobs. A
younger worker is more than 40% more likely to be offered an interview than an older worker. I
find no evidence to support taste-based discrimination as a reason for this differential and some
evidence to support statistical discrimination.
The second chapter examines more closely one of the possible reason for this differential
treatment. Older workers may cost employers more in terms of potential age discrimination
lawsuits. I study the effects of state and federal age discrimination laws between 1968 and 1991.
Prior to the enforcement of the federal law, state laws had little effect on older workers,
suggesting that firms either knew little about these laws or did not see them as a threat. After the
enforcement of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) in 1979, white male
workers over the age of 50 in states with age discrimination laws work fewer weeks per year and
are less likely to be hired or separated from their jobs, but are more likely to be retired (perhaps
involuntarily). These findings suggest a story in which firms do not wish to hire older workers,
are afraid to fire older workers, and remove older workers through strong incentives to retire in
states where lawsuits are less of a hurdle for the worker.
The third paper, co-authored with Melissa Boyle, explores the relationship between health
insurance coverage and labor market efficiencies termed "job-lock." We exploit an insurance
option which is bth truly exogenous to work decisions, and of lasting duration. A major
expansion in both the services provided and the population covered by the Department of
Veterans Affairs health care system allows us to both cleanly estimate the extent of job-lock, and
also to study the impact of publicly provided health care on labor supply. Using data from the
Current Population Survey, we examine the impact of health care coverage on labor force
participation and retirement by comparing veterans and non-veterans before and after the VA
expansion. Results indicate that workers are significantly more likely to cease working as a result
of becoming eligible for public insurance, and are also more likely to move to part-time work.
Thesis Supervisor: Dora L. Costa
Title: Professor of Economics
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Chapter One
Age, Women, and Hiring: An Experimental Study
1.1 Introduction
In a 2004 speech to the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan suggested that
encouraging older people to work could solve many of the problems that will occur as the
large baby boom cohort reaches retirement age.1 If older workers remained in the labor
force, social security benefits could be cut without compromising living standards. From
a productivity standpoint, workers should be capable of working longer than they had in
the past. Not only are people living longer, but several studies suggest that today's 70
year olds are comparable in health and mental function to 65 year olds from 30 years ago
(Schaie 1996, Baltes et al 1988). Many older Americans also need to work, even if social
security benefits are not cut. Bernheim (1997) estimates that baby boomers on average
are only saving a third of what they need to maintain a pre-retirement standard of living
after retirement. This lack of adequate retirement savings is especially acute for older
widows, who, on average, suffer a 30 percent drop in living standards upon the death of a
husband (Holden and Zick 1998). In fact, the poverty rate for older widows is 15%
(Favreault et al. 2002). Finally, Abraham and Houseman (2004) find that although most
older workers plan to continue working at least part time instead of fully retiring, those
who would have to change jobs in order to reduce hours are likely to stop working
entirely, suggesting that there is something preventing them from finding a new job.
Will older American women be able to find work? Economists generally assume
Alan Greenspan was not the first to suggest encouraging older workers to remain in the labor force as a
partial solution to the Social Security problem, see, for example, Diamond and Orszag (2002).
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that staying out of the labor force is a choice for women, so only supply-side factors
come into play in policy discussions, such as those regarding social security. This study
explores the demand-side of policies that rely on older women finding jobs at the normal
age of retirement by running a labor market experiment to explore the hiring behavior of
firms seeking entry-level or close to entry-level employees. Although a number of
sociology and psychology studies have directly examined age discrimination, these
studies typically present a human resources manager (or worse, a group of undergraduate
psychology students) with two resumes, one of an older worker and one of a younger
worker, and ask which the manager would be more likely to hire (e.g. Nelson 2002). In
contrast, this experiment analyzes real rather than hypothetical hiring choices by
businesses that do not know they are being studied.
My study examines the entry-level or close to entry-level labor market options for
women ages 35 to 62 in Boston, MA and St. Petersburg, FL. I send pairs of resumes to
employers in these two cities and measure the response rates by age, as indicated on each
resume by date of high school graduation. In addition, I explore reasons for differential
responses by age to resumes in several ways. First, I explore statistical discrimination,
which is defined as an employer judging a job applicant based on her age-group status
rather than on her own individual characteristics. To study this type of discrimination, I
look at the effect of resume elements that could signal that the older worker does not fit a
stereotype/group characteristic of older workers. Second, I look at employer taste-based
discrimination by examining the effect of a firm having a human resources department,
since these departments would be likely to have had training in discrimination law.
Third, I examine employee taste-based discrimination by looking at the age break-down
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of workers in each firm's geographic area. Finally, I examine consumer taste-based
discrimination by looking at the residential demographics of each firm's geographic area.
I find evidence of differential hiring by age in these two labor markets. A
younger worker is 42% more likely than an older worker to be offered an interview in
Massachusetts and 46% more likely to be offered an interview in Florida. Statistical
discrimination is the most likely explanation for this differential hiring behavior. This
study finds little to no evidence for taste-based discriminatory behavior, whether from
employers, co-workers or consumers, although the tests used are not perfect.
Age discrimination is comparatively understudied by economists.2 Although
displaced older workers take longer to find employment than do younger3 , it is not known
whether this delay is due to discrimination, higher reservation wages, or clustering in
dying industries. Experimental labor market studies such as this one have the advantage
of directly observing discrimination as it happens. Such studies have primarily examined
discrimination on the basis of gender and race (e.g. Fix and Struyk 1993, Yinger 1998,
Neumark et al. 1996). Only one set of these studies (a resume study combined with a
matched pairs audit) has explored age discrimination (Bendick et al. 1996, Bendick 1999)
and there is concern that this study lacks comparable controls (Riach and Rich 2002).
This paper is structured as follows: Section II gives some background
information on discrimination laws, testing for discrimination and types of
2 When discussing the term "discrimination," I use a value-free definition of the word, such as in Lundberg
and Startz (1983) that includes forms of differential behavior such as statistical discrimination, where it is
possible for the same average productivity to receive the same average compensation. It does not imply
that there is necessarily any animus-based discrimination, simply differential behavior.
3 The 2000 CPS Displaced Worker Survey finds that the average 12 weeks search time for workers age 55
to 74 was 3.6 weeks longer than that for workers age 19 to 39. Additionally, 39% of displaced older
workers in the February 2000 CPS had not found reemployment by the time of the survey, whereas only
19% of those between 40 and 54 had not found reemployment (US General Accounting Office 2001).
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discrimination. Section III gives an overview of the experimental design. Section IV
describes the empirical framework for both differential hiring by age and reasons for
differential hiring by age. Section V provides results and Section VI discusses
implications. Section VII concludes. Further information on the specifics of the
experimental design can be found in the data appendix at the end of the paper.
1.2 Background
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, implemented in 1968 and enforced
in 1978, covers workers age 40 and up in firms with 20 or more employees, with a few
exceptions.4 This law prohibits discrimination against older workers through hiring,
firing, and failure to promote mechanisms. Since it is more difficult for workers to
determine why they failed to receive an interview than it is for workers to determine why
they have been fired, firms that wish to retain only a certain type of worker without being
sued would prefer to discriminate in the hiring stage rather than at any other point of the
employment process.
Labor market studies such as this one that test for discrimination in hiring by
sending resumes are called "resume audits" in the United States and "correspondence
tests" in the United Kingdom. These studies directly test for discrimination with a
minimum of omitted variables bias. Other audit studies send two trained "auditors,"
matched in all respects except the variable of interest, usually race, to rent an apartment,
buy a house or interview for a job. In practice, however, it is difficult to match people
exactly5 ; one cannot rule out systematic differences observable to the employer between
4 Firms are exempt if they can prove a bona-fide occupational requirement (BFOQ) that is directly related
to age (for example, an acting position), or if the position is a high salaried policy making position.
5 Other problems with this method are elucidated by Heckman and Siegelman(1993) and Heckman (1998).
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the two groups being studied. Experiments such as this one, using randomized resumes,
potentially bypass the matching problem. This type of experiment also has the benefit of
being able to explore the different reasons that employers might discriminate against
older workers.
Economic theory generally distinguishes between two major types of
discrimination: statistical discrimination and taste-based discrimination. Statistical
discrimination occurs when an individual is judged based on group characteristics. This
form of discrimination is generally thought to be efficient for employers in cases of
imperfect information (Arrow 1972). For example, if, in general, it is true that older
workers take longer to learn unfamiliar tasks, then an employer may be reluctant to hire
an older worker, because testing each older applicant for ability to learn is costly. Taste-
based discrimination occurs when an employer, a set of employees, or a customer base,
gets disutility from working with individuals from a specific group. This form of
discrimination is generally thought to be inefficient from an overall welfare point of
view, although it provides utility to the discriminator (Becker 1971).
1.3 Experimental Design
I sent resumes to 3996 firms in the greater Boston, Massachusetts and greater St.
Petersburg, Florida areas. Boston was chosen for convenience and St. Petersburg was
chosen because it both has a similar demographic mix to what the US Census projects the
entire United States to have in the 2020s, that is, it has a large concentration of elderly,
and because the St. Petersburg/Tampa Bay MSA is approximately equal in magnitude to
10
the Boston PMSA.6 Each Sunday, 40 want-ads were culled from the Sunday Boston
Globe and 40 from the online version of the Sunday St. Petersburg Times.7 Monday
through Wednesday of each week, company names and numbers were randomly selected
from the Verizon superpages for Boston and for St. Petersburg and 10 firms were chosen
in each city as "call-ins." A computer program mixed and matched work histories and
other resume parts from actual entry-level applicants to randomly create new resumes for
specified positions. Genuine resumes for many different job categories were taken off of
online sites such as www.americasjobbank.com. These resumes were sorted by
occupation and age and had items such as previous work experience, licensure, awards,
hobbies and volunteer work collected together and entered into a computer program.
Summary statistics for the resumes can be found in the Appendix Tables la and lb .
Employers could reply to the job seekers via a voicemail box obtained from
www.mynycoffice.com and an email address from www.hotmail.com. Detailed
information on the process of resume creation and distribution can be found in the Data
Appendix.
For the most part, the resumes created for the audit used items from actual
resumes (but not in any way that could be connected to the original resume). Two items
included in some of the sent resumes did not appear in actual resumes: the specific
places of high school graduation and a declaration of health insurance status. Two
schools from small college towns from the Midwest were chosen so that employers could
not use perceived high school quality (from 17 to 44 years ago) as a signal for worker
6 The Boston PMSA had a population of 3,285,387 in 1998, Tampa/St. Petersburg had a population of
2,254,405 in 1998.
7 The St. Petersburg Times puts all of its want-ads online, whereas the Boston Globe charges employers
extra to be included in the online listings.
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quality. Some resumes in the experiment included a statement that the applicant did not
need health insurance benefits. First names chosen for the job candidates were the first
and second most popular female names in the United States for the year of birth of that
candidate (Mary and Linda), and the last names chosen were the first and second most
popular last names in the US (Smith and Jones), according to social security
administration data.8 The addresses chosen were from middle class neighborhoods
which, according to the census, had a wide variation in income and other demographic
characteristics (for example, Somerville, MA).
Unlike race or gender, age is a continuous variable. Because I use multiple ages
in my study instead of only two ages (e.g. as in Bendick et al. 1999), I can better
understand how age interacts with hiring decisions. I chose age 62, the early retirement
age, rather than 65, the full retirement age, as the later endpoint for the survey because 65
is the age Medicare benefits generally begin and thus could signal lower health care costs
to potential employers. I did not use ages earlier than 35 for two reasons. First, I had to
limit the total number of ages I used in order to be able to collect a sample size large
enough to preserve power and since my focus is on the older ages, 35 seemed more
natural than, for example, 25, as a cutoff.9 Second, because the current resume standard
is to display a 10 year job history, I wanted a potential employer to assume that each
applicant was doing the same thing during that ten year history if there were gaps in the
resume (e.g. taking care of her family and not going to school).
Word of mouth, not formal advertisement, accounts for most job matches,
according to Holzer (1996). However, formal methods are still important, especially for
8 http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/NOTES/note 139/original notel 39.html
9 Initially I had chosen 45 as my "start" age, but after I obtained additional funding, I was able to add 35
before the start of the actual study.
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those lacking social networks. To get a more representative sample of job openings than
can be found through the want-ads alone, I added 10 entries per city per week generated
from calling companies randomly chosen from the Verizon yellow pages. 0l° The response
rate for call-ins was about half that for want-ads. However, the ratio of older
positive/interview responses to younger was very similar whether the ad had been
generated via want-ad or via call-in1 , thus providing some evidence that the degree of
differential hiring does not vary much with method used, at least if the method still has
some degree of formality. For more information on how these "call-ins" were generated,
see the Data Appendix. 12
Resumes were sent in pairs via fax.' 3 A coin was flipped each time a pair of
resumes was sent to determine which would be sent first. Via the randomness of the
computer program used to create resumes, employer bias was randomized across each
high school graduation date. Employers who left at least two messages for the
prospective candidate were informed in a timely fashion that the candidate had already
accepted a job elsewhere so as not to inconvenience area firms. Overall I had a
"positive" response rate of 8% in Massachusetts and 10% in Florida and an "interview"
rate of 4% in Massachusetts and 5% in Florida.
To distinguish between age discrimination and discrimination based on
'0 I did not add more because the marginal additional call-in was much more time intensive to collect than
the marginal additional want-ad.
" The exact ratios of younger positive responses to older (keeping in mind older contains more dates of
high school graduation than younger) for Massachusetts are: .778 positive if want-ad, .770 if call-in; .92
interview if want-ad, 1.00 if call-in. For Florida these ratios are: Positive: .763 if want-ad, .741 if call-in;
Interview: .906 if want-ad and 1.14 if call-in. The ratios of negative/null responses follow a similar pattern.
12 Online resume clearinghouses were also tried, but, since the economy had cooled by the time the
experiment started, the responses they generated were representative of what one finds in one's spamn filter.
13 Only two resumes were sent to each employer because an employer would be likely to get suspicious
should he or she receive four virtually identical resumes in a short time period, whereas two resumes are
much more likely to be thought of as a coincidence if noticed at all.
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differences in human capital or based on perceived gaps in work history, I employed a
number of design measures. First, I only sent resumes for women because an employer is
more likely to assume that a woman entering or re-entering the labor market has been
taking care of her family, rather than returning from prison or a long spell of
unemployment, as would be the case for a man. Second, I limited work histories to 10
years, since conversations with human resource professionals and an examination of
actual resumes suggested that this length is common practice.14 Third, I indicated that the
applicant was currently employed at an entry-level job so that all applicants had current
experience at some form of work (thus diminishing fears that older workers had a longer
time for human capital to deteriorate). Finally, I limited my study to entry-level jobs,
where entry-level is defined as anything which requires at most one year of education
plus experience combined. For these jobs, job-specific human capital should be less of a
concern.
Although these limitations can only say something about a specific segment of the
labor market, my controls are comparable enough that my results can be trusted.
Additionally, I study an important segment of the labor force; the population of older
women is larger than that of men and older women are more likely to be living in poverty
than men (Favreault et al. 2002). Finally, many entry-level or close to entry-level jobs,
14 I spoke to human resource professionals from three places-first, several professionals from the hiring
department from a large university, second, someone who had worked as a human resources professional
for a business firm, but had recently had a career transition to a post where she helped other people
determine career transitions, and third, two representatives from a non-profit temporary agency/career
placement firm. They all said that ten-year histories are the current gold standard for resumes, although
they get many resumes that do not look like the standard. The placement agency said that a big part of their
job was to get applicants to make their resumes look like the current standard and the university hiring
department said that using an outdated resume style was often an indication that the applicant was older.
The university hr department told me that while one was not supposed to put dates of education on
resumes, most people did, and it was generally in an applicant's best interest to put down dates of education
if it was recent.
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such as cashier positions, secretarial work, or home health care tend to be female-
dominated jobs, and thus it would not seem unusual for a woman to apply for these
positions, whereas a man applying to these positions might be considered suspect.
1.4 Empirical Framework
1.4.1 Differential Hiring by Age
To test for differential hiring by age, I sent paired resumes matched on all
characteristics except age15, as indicated by date of high school graduation, to prospective
employers in the entry-level labor market. Then I measured the rate of positive responses
and interview responses by age. Positive or "callback" responses are those where the
applicant was called back and given a "positive" sounding response but not specifically
offered an interview. Examples included asking the applicant to call back or saying that
the caller has questions. They did not include responses that are obviously negative, such
as information that the position has been filled. Interview responses specifically asked
the applicant to call back to set up an interview or to meet in person.
There are many ways to measure age given my setup. I looked at high school
graduation cohort dummies, age as a continuous variable, and a dummy which broke high
school graduation cohorts into two groups: older and younger. The results should be
similar, but different age configurations give varying amounts of power.
First I ran differential probits on positive response and interview responses using
high school graduation dummies as the independent variables of interest:
5 It is of note that I did not need to match the resumes on characteristics since I use standard differential
probit methods to analyze the data rather than the audit methodology of a "paired difference of means" test.
Since I targeted a large number of firms, and the resumes were sent randomly, I should get the same results
with the regressions I run even had I not matched the resumes. Indeed, since there are five possible ages, it
is not even clear what the proper "paired difference of means" test should be.
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pr[Responsei =1] = pr[BI(Controls)i + B2(Graduation Cohort) i+ e] (1)
= I4)[B(Controls)i + B 2(Graduation Cohort) i]
where tI represents the normal CDF. The tables report the marginal effects, prob
(Responsei =1)/ aXi, where Xi is the vector of explanatory variables. Here, Response is
either a positive response or an interview response, i refers to the individual, and the set
of graduation cohort dummies include indicators for graduating in 1959, 1966, 1971,
1976 and 1986. Controls include the number of years of work history out of 10, typos,
college experience, relevant computer experience, volunteer work, sport, other hobby,
insurance, flexibility, attendance award, and a set of occupation dummies. Since the
explanatory variables are dummy variables, this differential probit reports the discrete
change in the probability of interview for each variable.
A second way to test for discrimination is to treat age indicated on resume as a
continuous variable using a probit:
pr[Responsei = 1 ] = (D[BI (Controls)j+ B2 (Age) i] (2)
Then the marginal effect a prob (Responsei = 1)/ Xi represents the discrete change in the
probability of a positive response or interview for each of controls, and the infinitesimal
change in the probability of interview for age. Controls are as reported before.
Finally, employers may mentally group workers into "older" and "younger"
categories. I break up high school graduation dates into two groups, one for workers age
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50 and older and one for workers under age 50, and run a t-test comparing the probability
of being called back or interviewed for each group. To compare older and younger
groups, controlling for resume and industry characteristics, I run an OLS regression for
each group:
Responsei = Bl (Controls)i + B2 (Older)i + t (3)
and retrieve the predicted probability for the response. Then I run a t-test comparing
these predicted probabilities for each group. Alternatively, another test for these two
groups, again using the probit, is:
pr[Responsei =1] = 1[ B (Controls)i + B2 (Older)i] (4)
Where Older is a dummy indicating that the worker is age 50 or older. The marginal
effect pr(Responsei =1)/ X represents the discrete change in the probability of
interview for each variable.
1.4.2 Reasonsfor Differential Hiring by Age
1.4.2.1 Statistical Discrimination
My experimental setup enables me to explore different possible reasons for this
differential hiring, or discrimination. 6 The first type of discrimination I look at is
161 do not differentiate between stereotypes which are true (and thus fit in standard models of statistical
discrimination, such as Phelps (1972)) and stereotypes which are false, but employers believe to be true.
One can make the argument that since workers who are hired young often age into the firm, that firms
which employ larger numbers of workers may have some experience with older workers and are less likely
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statistical discrimination, which in its most basic definition, is judging an individual on
group characteristics rather than individual characteristics. More formally, I assume the
model by Phelps (1972) as outlined in Aigner and Cain (1977) where I assume that
employers measure expected skill through an indicator y based on the observed true skill
level q and a measurement error u, thus y = q + u. I assume that the variance of u is equal
for the two groups and the variance of q is greater for older workers than for younger.17
This model provides a framework where positive information about the ability, that is a
higher y, helps older workers more than it helps younger workers (the y-E(q) graph will
have a steeper slope for older workers than for younger). For example, an indication that
an older worker has taken a computer class will cause a greater marginal increment to
expected productivity for the older than younger worker, that is, it will help an older
worker more than it will help a younger worker.18
I tested for statistical discrimination by randomly including items on resumes that
signaled that the worker did not fit into a standard stereotype.19 For example, to test
whether employers think older workers are inflexible and unchanging, I include a
statement that the applicant was flexible or "willing to embrace change." To test for the
effect of these variables on the probability of getting a callback or interview, I interact
to believe false stereotypes. Additionally, the notion of feedback effects (as in Lundberg and Startz 1983)
into educational choices is less of an issue because even though older workers may choose training, the
majority of education decisions have already been made. There may still be feedback effects in terms of
decisions whether or not to remain in the labor market, however.
17 Average true ability for the two groups is assumed either equal or that true ability is lower for older
workers than for younger.
18 Different assumptions provide a model where the test is less reliable for older workers and thus a positive
ability signal would help younger workers more than older. However, there is no reason to assume that
either younger workers have larger variance in, for example, computer ability or would get more out of a
basic computer skills course than older workers, unlike the case where many black high schools are
assumed to be of more variable/worse quality than many white high schools.
19 Stereotypes examined came from a list of the top 10 reasons for discrimination against older workers
according to a 1984 survey of 363 companies where hiring managers were asked for reasons that other
companies might discriminate against older workers (Rhine 1984). Not all top 10 reasons could be
explored using this experimental design.
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each of these variables with older.
pr[Responsei =1] = 4[B (Controls) i + B2 (SDRi) + B3(Older) + B4 (Older * SDRi)] (5)
Where SDR is the reason for statistical discrimination which is being tested and Controls
include the number of years of work history out of 10O, typos, college experience, relevant
computer experience, volunteer work, sport, other hobby, insurance, flexibility,
attendance award, and a set of occupation dummies, except when the reason tested is one
of those controls.
Since an interaction term is measuring the difference between the slopes of the
SDR term when Older = 0 and when Older = 1, I can measure the same results by
running the regressions separately for each group. I also run regressions on just the
controls and variables of interest (not including an age-related variable) separately for
older and younger groups and compare coefficients. This format is identical to the
interaction:
pr[Responsei =1] = I[B (Controls)i + B2 (SDR,) + B 3(Olderi) + B4 (Older * SDRi)] (6)
Where SDR here is a vector of reasons for statistical discrimination and other variables
are as described earlier. Showing regressions separately for Older= 1 and Older = 0 has
the benefit of efficiently showing multiple interactions at the same time.
Another method to differentiate between statistical discrimination and employer
taste-based discrimination using the presence of a human resources department is
19
described in the next section.
1.4.2.2 Taste-Based Discrimination
Employer
Human resource professionals may have less taste-based discrimination because
of training and knowledge of discrimination laws, although they might be more likely to
practice statistical discrimination through learning.20 Thus, I study employer
discrimination by interacting a dummy indicating whether or not a company has a human
resources department, HR, with age:
pr[Responsei =1] = I4[B (Controls) i + B2 (HRi) + B3(Olderi) + B4 (Olderi * HA?)] (7)
where HR is a dummy variable indicating whether or not a company has a human
resources department. Older and Controls are as described before.
Employee
My tests for employee taste-based discrimination and customer taste-based
discrimination rely on the assumption that people are less likely to discriminate against
those in their own group. To study employee discrimination, I interact age with
OverSOWork, the percentage of people employed in the area where the business is located
over the age of 50:
pr[Responsei= 1]
20 Unlike the usual case for race or gender, one's age status does change while employed. Thus an
employer can end up observing the productivity of a group of older workers even if it never hired older
workers.
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= c[B (Controls)i + B2 (Over50Worki) + B3(Older) + B4 (Older * Over5OWorki)] (8)
Here Over5OWork is a continuous variable indicating the percentage of people over the
age of 50 who work in the firm's place of work PUMA, as indicated by the 2000 census.
Controls and Older are defined as above.
Customer
My test for customer taste-based discrimination is similar to that of employee
taste-based discrimination, except that instead of looking at the percentage of people
employed in an area, I look at the percentage of people who reside in the area where the
business is located:
pr[Responsei= 1 ]
= [B (Controls)i + B2(Over50i) + B3 (Older ) + B4 (Older * Over50i)] (9)
Here OverS0 is a continuous variable indicating the percentage of people over the age of
50 who live in the firm's zipcode, as indicated by the 2000 census. Since people who
work in services and sales are more likely to interact with consumers, I also run equation
(9) using only service and sales occupations.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Differential Hiring by Age
Figures I a and b show an upward trend for the positive response based on date
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of high school graduation, as in equation (1). This trend is much more marked using
interview as the dependent variable. Although no two adjacent years are statistically
significantly different from the 0 to 5 percent level, the results are suggestive. In
Massachusetts, the interview results show a statistically significant difference at the 5
percent level between the oldest, hsgradS9, and youngest hsgrad86. Interview results
may be stronger than positive for two reasons. First, not all "positive" responses may
actually be positive-some asking for more information could be preludes to rejection,
thus producing measurement error. Secondly, more subtle forms of discrimination, such
as calling one person back more enthusiastically than another, are less likely to be
discovered than overtly failing to call back the older candidate. In fact, the caller may not
even realize that he or she has treated the candidates differently.
The most significant results are found breaking up age categories into
"older/younger" groups where older is defined to be age 50, 55, and 62 and younger is
defined to be ages 35 and 45.2 Table 1 describes t-test results comparing the mean
response rates for these two age categories with controls as calculated in (3) and without
controls. For callbacks, there is a difference of 1.5 percentage points, or 19%, in
Massachusetts and 1.7 percentage points, or 18%, in Florida. For interviews, these
differences are 1.6 percentage points, or 42%, for Massachusetts and 2.0 percentage
points, or 46%, for Florida.22 The average younger job seeker in Massachusetts needs to
file, on average, 11 ads to get one callback whereas an older needs to file 13. A younger
21 I also tried breaking up older and younger categories by placing 50 in the younger category (older2 and
younger2) and leaving 50 out altogether (older3 and younger3). Results were similar across categories but,
defining 50 as older produced the strongest results.
22 If I take the lowest point in the confidence interval for younger workers and divide that by the highest
point in the confidence interval for older workers, and then do the same with the highest point for younger
workers and lowest point for older workers, I get a range of a younger worker being -.05 to 113% more
likely to get an interview in Massachusetts and -.02 to 117% more likely to get an interview in Florida.
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seeker needs to file 19 ads for one interview request and an older job seeker 27. In
Florida, a younger worker needs to file 9 and an older worker 11 ads to get a positive
response. These numbers are 16 and 23 respectively for an interview response. A probit
including older as an age dummy, as in equation (4), results in a negative and significant
coefficient for older for interviews in Massachusetts and Florida and callbacks in
Massachusetts, as shown in Table 2.
A final way of looking at the effect on age is to actually regress on age as if it
were a continuous variable as in equation (2). This method provides more power than
using age dummies. Table 2 shows that the marginal effect coefficient on age is negative
but not significant at the 5% level such that for each additional year of age, a worker is
.07% less likely to be called back in Massachusetts and between .04% and .06% less
likely to be called back in Florida.23 This effect is both negative and significant at the 5%
level for the interview response, with each additional year of age causing a worker to be
.07% less likely to be called back for an interview in Massachusetts and between .067
and -0.09 less likely to be called for an interview in Florida. Thus there is differential
interviewing by age. Specifically, assuming linearity24 , in Massachusetts, the mean
applicant would have to answer 1 additional ad to receive a callback for each additional
10 years of age, and 4.5 additional ads to receive an interview request. In Florida, each
additional 10 years of age would require 5 more ads to produce a callback and 3.5 more
ads to produce an interview (interview responses have a lower base rate, so even though
23 Depending on whether or not controls are included. Since employers may treat certain characteristics
differently depending on age, in a non-linear probit model the coefficient of age can change based on
whether or not they are included, even if the characteristics are randomized across resumes. In ordinary
least squares model the coefficient would not change. Additionally, although age is uncorrelated with the
controls by design, in a finite sample there may still be correlation induced by chance.
24 An age squared term came up insignificant in probit regressions. However, I cannot reject a cubic age
specification for the interview response in the Florida set. The cubic age specification is not significant in
the Massachusetts set.
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the percentage decrease by age is more interviews, .067% rather than .04%, this decrease
translates into a worker having to apply to 10.7 rather than 10.2 ads for each year of age
to get a callback and 23.2 rather than 22.9 ads for each year for an interview).
Companies could also discriminate in more subtle ways than failing to call back
or to ask for an interview. Other possible outcomes are calling back the younger
applicant sooner than the older applicant, or calling back the younger applicant multiple
times but only calling the older applicant once. Although there are examples where
either of these outcomes is the case, on average there is not statistically significant
discrimination for either of these possibilities (results not shown). I also briefly looked at
actual negative responses, but not only were there very few of these, but I have reason to
believe that when negative responses are sent out, many of them are sent via postal
mail.25 Since I do not have information on postal responses for the majority of
applications, it is not feasible to use negative responses as an outcome.
1.5.2 Reasons for Differential Hiring by Age
Economists recognize two main categories of discrimination: statistical
discrimination and taste-based discrimination. Statistical discrimination can occur based
on observables, such as work history or typographical errors, or unobservables, such as
energy or ability to learn. In my experimental setup, observables are identical for each
resume pair sent and thus cannot be responsible for the differential hiring. To look at the
effect of unobservables, I included items on the resumes to signal that the applicant did
25 In the Massachusetts part of the sample, I was able to collect mail at one of the two addresses that were
randomly assigned to resumes. Through this collection, I did not find any positive or interview responses,
but did receive some negative responses. The majority of written responses were post-cards stating receipt
of the application. There were a few requesting more information, but these also requested more
information via phone or email as well.
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not fit a number of stereotypes cited by managers as reasons firms might be reluctant to
hire older workers (Rhine 1984). The effects of these variables are discussed in more
detail below and are detailed in Table 3 which gives results from running equation (5)
separately by older status.
1.5.2.1 Statistical Discrimination
Employers may statistically discriminate because they fear that older workers will
"cost" more in terms of absences and benefits. To test whether or not companies
statistically discriminate against older workers because they assume older workers will
have more absences, I introduced an item on the resume saying that the applicant has won
an attendance award. This variable is positive but not significant at the 5% level. If
anything, attendance awards help younger workers more than older in terms of
magnitude. To see whether or not higher health insurance costs are a reason older
workers are not hired, I put in the statement that a worker does not need insurance
coverage.26 Although having insurance seems to help getting a callback overall in
Massachusetts, nothing can be said by age at the 5% level. Already having insurance
increases the likelihood of getting a callback or interview in Massachusetts, but helps
only younger workers and may hurt older workers in Florida, although, again, these
results are not significant. Employers could also fear that older workers may be less
likely to have reliable transportation, and thus may be tardy or absent from work for this
reason. There is no evidence that commute time, matched by zipcode to place of work
26 Although, according to Blue Cross/Blue Shield (personal communication), health insurance costs
generally stay the same for women until the age of 65 (the possibility of pregnancy goes down as a woman
ages) there is some doubt that human resource managers are aware of the fact. Scott et al. (1995) find that
older age hiring is lower in firms that offer health insurance. However, firms that offer benefits such as
health insurance are different than firms which do not. For example, they tend to be larger and have steeper
earnings profiles as well (Idson and Oi 1999).
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PUMA affects older or younger workers differently (results not shown).
Employers may also worry that older workers will not be as productive as
younger. First, they may believe that older workers' knowledge and skills are obsolete.
For this reason I added a variable indicating that the worker had gotten a computer
certificate in 1986 (which would be outdated), 1996 or 2002/2003 when such skills would
be relevant and recent. Although not significant, relevant computer experience helps
younger workers to get interviews in Florida more than older workers. However, in
Massachusetts, it helps older workers more than younger, although the interaction term is
only significant at the 40% level.27 Vocational training28 helps younger workers more
than older workers to get both callbacks and interviews. An interaction between
vocational training and older (not shown) gives this result to be significant at the 5%
level for Florida, but not for Massachusetts. Second, employers may be worried that
older workers lack energy. To test this reason, I introduced an item on the resume saying
the applicant plays sports. For the most part, this variable is not significant. It is
significant and negative for the callback response for younger workers in Massachusetts
and significant and positive for the interview response for younger workers in Florida.
Although an interaction term shows putting sports on the resume to hurt older workers
less than younger workers, this finding is only significant for positive responses at the
20% level in Massachusetts.
Third, previous research has suggested that older women use volunteer work as a
"stepping stone" to labor market work (Stephen 1991), and, indeed, I find that having
27 Interaction results have also been done using the Norton adjustment, and results still hold (Norton et al.
2002). Magnitudes may change, but signs and 5% significance do not.
28 Note that occupation and vocational training are mechanically related in this experiment because
vocational training was only given to resumes for which it was required (such as dental assisting or
nursing).
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volunteer work listed helps older women more than younger. 29 Fourth, Bendick (1996)
found that the biggest help to an older worker's resume was to signal that he or she was
flexible or "willing to embrace change." Although only significant at the 10% level for
Massachusetts, I found that having this statement on a resume hurts an older worker, but
does not hurt a younger worker.30 This difference in findings may be because the AARP
has been recommending that older workers put such statements on their resumes since the
time of Bendick's study and thus this statement now signals that the worker is old.
Finally, experience may interact with age as a form of statistical discrimination.
Employers may assume that older workers have more experience, or they may be
prejudiced against an older worker if she does not have more experience than a younger
worker. I looked at this issue in two different ways. First, I looked to see what effect
having experience in the same occupation for which the worker was applying had for the
different age groups. Although no interactions of same experience with age are
significant at the 5% level (not shown), having occupational experience listed on the
resume similar to occupation being applied to the helps younger workers more than older
workers as shown in Table 4. However, a different effect is found for implied
experience-that is, when the want-ad requires experience 3; older workers were hurt less
than younger workers, as shown in Tables 4, although again, this finding is not
significant at the 5% level. Thus there is slight evidence that employers are more likely
to give older workers the benefit of the doubt in terms of experience, but only when
29 The interaction of older and volunteer is positive and significant at the 25% for positive outcomes and
30% level for interview outcomes in Florida, but only at the 46% level for interview in Massachusetts.
30 The interaction of older and flexible is significant at the 14% level for the interview variable in
Massachusetts and at the 70% level for Florida.
31 Admissible want-ads could include requirements of up to a year of experience, whether the applicant had
it on the resume or not.
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neither applicant lists the required experience on the resume. Otherwise, having the
required experience may help younger workers more than older. This possibility
suggests that the entry-level labor market may be different in terms of age discrimination
from markets requiring more experience.
1.5.2.2 Taste-Based Discrimination
Employer
One form of taste-based discrimination is employer discrimination, in which the
employer him or herself (or those doing the hiring) prefers one group over another based
on his or her own tastes. Human resource professionals may have less taste-based
discrimination because of training and knowledge of discrimination laws, although they
might be more likely to practice statistical discrimination based on learning from past
hires. Bendick (1994) assumes that firm size is a proxy for having a human resources
department and finds that there is no link between race discrimination and firm size. I
found no link between having a human resources department and being more or less
discriminatory using equation (7). In my study, firms with human resources departments
may be more likely to interview younger workers, which would support the case of
statistical rather than taste-based discrimination, but this finding is not significant.32 The
controlled coefficient on the interaction term between Older and HR for Florida for the
interview outcome is -0.007with a standard error of 0.018 and this coefficient for
32 Another possible way of measuring employer taste-based discrimination is to examine the hiring
interaction between the ages of employers or human resources professionals and applicants. However, I
have been unable to collect information on employer age. Additionally, just because an employer is a
member of a group does not mean that he or she will not discriminate against other members. For example,
Dick Clark, age 76, was recently sued for age discrimination
http://www. cnn. com/2004/LA W/03/02/dick. clark. sued ap/.
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Massachusetts is -0.017 with a standard error of 0.0195.33
Employee
Another form of taste-based discrimination occurs when employees prefer to
work with members of a certain group. Younger employees might prefer to not to work
with older employees, especially when the older employee is in a subordinate position.
To test for this type of discrimination, I match zipcodes from my dataset to place of work
PUMA information on worker age from the census and look at the effect of percentage of
workers over 40, over 50 and over 61 employed in the PUMA.34 I found no effect of the
age of a company's workforce on the differential hiring by age, thus providing no support
35for employee taste-based discrimination (results not shown).35 However, this measure
may be too crude, as it matches zipcode to place of work PUMA information rather than
using the percentage of workers by age in a firm.
Customer
A final source of taste-based discrimination comes from the consumer base.
Consumers may prefer to buy from or interact with employees who are like them. To test
for this type of discrimination, I used the census to get age profiles of zipcodes in Florida
and Massachusetts and matched them to the zipcodes of the companies applied to in the
study. Taste-based discrimination should be even higher in occupations where there is
interaction with the public, such as in sales and service. There is no evidence of
33 A Norton correction does not change the sign or significance of these effects. The main effects for
Florida are -0.008 for older and 0.010 for HR. In Massachusetts, these effects are -0.021 for older and
0.018 for HR.
34 This effect of older workers in a company influencing the age of new hires is not mechanical because
older employees may have been hired young and aged with the company.
35 For the percentage over age 50 interaction with older, the FL coefficient is .00139 with a standard error
of .00286 and the MA coefficient is -.660 with a standard error of .478.
29
consumer taste-based discrimination; areas with higher percentages over the age of 50 are
more likely to call back or to interview in general and these results are stronger for
younger workers than for older. The results are similar when only service and sales
positions are looked at (results not shown). Thus there is no evidence that younger
consumer bases prefer workers in the same age group.
1.6 Implications
These differential responses have real implications for older potential workers.
One may wonder, "So older workers have to send in a few more applications to get an
interview, so what?" Aside from the psychological implications of implied rejection,
there are economic consequences to this sort of differential that are more severe for some
occupations than others. First, the number of applications sent to receive an interview
vary by occupation. Using general occupation categories, the number of applications
needed for an interview ranges from a low of 5.5 for younger workers and 10 for older
workers in healthcare positions in Florida to a high of 32 ads for younger workers and 72
ads for older workers seeking clerical positions in Massachusetts.3 6 Second, many
occupations have a limited number of positions advertised each week. For example, on a
randomly chosen Sunday in Florida, there were 34 LPN jobs being offered but only 8
pre-school teacher positions. For some professions, such as jewelry appraiser (which
requires 6 months to a year of training), it is possible to call almost every jewelry store in
36 With "low" and "high," I am only including general occupation categories that have at least 200 resumes
sent. There are some occupational categories with low sample sizes, such as professional/technical non-
healthcare (mostly pre-school teachers) in Florida that received no responses for older workers, and thus
would, by the metric used, require an infinite number of resumes to receive an interview. However, only
51 resumes were sent to p/t non-healthcare positions in Florida. There were 558 healthcare resumes sent in
Florida and 1057 clerical resumes sent in Massachusetts.
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the area over the course of a year and only net one interview.37 Finally, given that the
wages for many of these occupations are not very high (often minimum wage), it is likely
that persons seeking these jobs also do not have a large amount of wealth to finance an
extended job search, especially if they cannot receive employment benefits.
What does this mean for older vs. younger workers? Conditional on getting an
interview response, it takes on average 8 days to be offered an interview. I have not been
able to find information on the number of interviews it takes to get an entry-level job, but
one online firm38 finds that it takes 7-10 interviews on average for a college graduate to
obtain a job offer. Using a back of the envelope calculation with one of the professions
most likely to be hired, a new licensed practical nurse39 sending out -30 applications a
week can expect 3 interviews a week as an older worker and 6 interviews a week as a
younger worker. Assuming it takes 7-10 interviews to land a job, a younger worker
could expect an employment offer in a little over a week, and an older worker 3 weeks.
But this is the best case scenario. An older worker attempting to find clerical work could
file close to 100 applications per week and expect to be given an offer 7 to 10 weeks later
(a younger worker would get an offer in half that time), using the same back of the
envelope calculation, and that is only assuming that there are 100 unique new clerical ads
each week, which, since a large number of ads are run at least two weeks in a row, is
unlikely. For someone who needs to work because of a lack of savings, several months
without income could be critical.
37 Which was the case in Florida.
38 www.onestop.com
39 A profession which takes year of training and had a median salary of $31,440 in 2002 according to the
BLS Occupational Outlook Handbook. http://bls.gov/oco/ocos 1l02.htm
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1.7 Concluding Comments
This study clearly shows differential interviewing by age for entry-level positions
in contemporary labor markets. I found that younger applicants are 44% more likely to
be requested for an interview in Massachusetts and 43% more likely in Florida. The
extent of discrimination against older workers is similar to that of discrimination against
women or blacks.4 0 I found no evidence of taste-based discrimination. I found some
evidence for statistical discrimination against workers along a few dimensions, such as
skills obsolescence, as signaled by adding relevant computer experience to a resume (but
only in Massachusetts). Many resume items helped younger workers but either hurt or
did not affect older workers.
Future research needs to be done both exploring other labor markets, such as the
non-entry-level market, and pinpointing additional reasons for statistical discrimination.
In non-entry-level positions, there may be taste-based discrimination against younger
workers supervising older workers, which would suggest that there would be less age
discrimination against older workers in these markets. For example, managerial positions
in Florida (but not Massachusetts) tended to prefer older workers, interviewing 4% of
older applicants and 1% of younger workers. I also found differences in differential
hiring between occupations; Blue-collar and male-dominated occupations in the sample
tend to prefer older workers to younger. Since these occupations in my sample tend to be
clustered in dying industries, there may be a bias towards hiring workers with shorter
40 Neumark et. al (1996) find evidence of 47% differential interview requests against female waitstaff in
high-price restaurants and 40% towards female waitstaff in lower-price restaurants. Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2003) find that applicants with white sounding names are 50 percent more likely to be called
for an interview than applicants with black sounding names. It is somewhat difficult to compare the extent
of the magnitude of age discrimination to race or gender discrimination, since age is not a binary variable
and breaking into older and younger categories can be done arbitrarily. I might have found more had I
been comparing, for example, 32 year olds to 90 year olds only.
32
expected future work-lives.
Another reason for discrimination against older workers that could not be tested in
this set-up is that older workers cost more because they can sue employers under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act. In this volume, Lahey (2005b), looks at the effect of
age discrimination laws on older workers. Although it finds that these laws have a
significant and negative effect on older white men, it does not find a similar effect for
older women. Since the current cohort of older women is unlikely to sue, employers may
not take possible litigation into consideration in the hiring process.
This study provides evidence that the demand for labor from older workers is
smaller than that for younger workers. Simply encouraging older workers to reenter the
labor force will not guarantee that they will be able to find jobs in a timely manner, if at
all. This study also has important implications for women who are most likely to need
additional work-those with little work experience who unexpectedly need to enter the
labor market, such as widows, those whose husbands have lost jobs and cannot find
employment, or divorcees. Although there are more older women than older men, the
majority of economic surveys on aging and work focus on a random sample of men and,
if they include women at all, only include spouses. Any policy which depends on older
people finding work to maintain their quality of living, such as changing social security
benefits, needs to consider this demand side.
1.8 Data Appendix
The use of a computer program to randomly generate items to create many
different possible resumes is a large improvement over earlier studies. First, unlike
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studies where a limited number of resumes are used, it lessens (and can test for) the
possibility that an employer is reacting to something specific in the particular resume sent
out. Additionally, because there is no human interaction with the resume during its
creation, the possibility of injecting subjectivity into the process of matching resumes
with job openings is completely eliminated. Resumes and resume items (other than the
objective) are truly randomly assigned to job openings, eliminating many possibilities for
bias.
The computer program used to prepare and match resumes is best explained
through example. Say that a job vacancy for a receptionist has been found. The
researcher will open the computer program specifying jobs for a receptionist position.
The computer program will first randomly choose two of the possible women to apply to
the job, for example, Linda Jones (age 45) and Mary E. Smith (age 62). It will then pick
an objective statement for Linda ("To obtain a position as a receptionist") and a matching
one for Mary ("To secure a position as receptionist"). Similarly it will match work
histories and high school. Next it will decide whether or not to test for one or more of the
possible reasons for discrimination through adding items to the resume. As an example,
to see if lack of energy is a reason employers discriminate against older people, the
computer will put under hobbies that Linda Jones is a tennis player, then designate Mary
E. Smith as a racquetball player. Regressions found no significant difference between
response rates for tennis and racquetball players, or any of the other possible paired
choices.
Variations on the resumes ranged as follows. Candidates were named Mary E.
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Smith or Linda Jones.4 1 The objectives included sales positions, office positions, entry-
level nursing positions, wait staff positions and other entry-level or close to entry-level
positions that require only a year of combined post-high school education and experience
to obtain. All resumes had the applicant currently working at a job. Dates of high school
graduation included 1959, 1966, 1971, 1976 and 1986. High schools chosen were Ames
High School in Ames City, Iowa and DeKalb High School in DeKalb, IL. Some resumes
had experience in computer classes, either from 1986, which makes such experience
obsolete, 1996, when the experience is useful but not recent or 2002/2003 when the
experience is both useful and recent. Current employment varied as well and ranged
from cashier work to secretarial work with a couple of "unusual" jobs possible, such as
those giving fork-lift experience. Volunteer work included work at homeless shelters or
food banks. Hobbies included some combination of tennis, racquetball, gardening and
crafting. An attendance award could also be listed. All resumes had email addresses
listed.42 Appendix Tables la and lb show how resume characteristics were distributed
across high school graduation dates.
Typos were introduced to the study in two different ways: First, purposefully
coded typographical errors were programmed into the resume machine during the first
half of the study when there was more hiring in general. These typos were representative
41 Mary gets a middle initial because in my experience, and the experience of those I've spoken with,
anyone over the age of 30 whose first name is Mary always adds her middle name or middle initial,
especially if her last name is also common (unless there's a "Peter, Paul, and..." in front of the Mary). I
have not had the same experience with Linda as a first name, although when asked, Linda's middle initial is
M.
42 The census finds that 47% of householders age 45 to 64 have internet access at home
(http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p23-207.pdf). Additionally, places which help people to find work,
such as Project Able, strongly encourage applicants to get email addresses and many job finding sites
actually take seekers through the steps of signing up for a free hotmail account. Finally, adding an email
address to an older resume is likely to work in the older resume's favor, and thus I should find even lower
acceptance rates for older workers without adding email addresses.
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of those found in actual resumes-they included things like missing punctuation marks,
large words that had been misspelled and inconsistent indentation. The second kind of
error was inadvertently introduced when applying for a job that did not fit one of the
major job categories in the resume program. These errors included things like putting an
"a" where an "an" should be or other similar mistakes that native English speakers do not
normally make. There are many fewer of these errors and they tend to be most prevalent
in Florida and when there was a research assistant regime change.
Call-ins were performed because many entry-level jobs are never advertised via
want-ad. I could not use walk-ins because a pilot study showed that, not only were walk-
ins time consuming, but many of them generated actual paper job applications with
questions whose answers were difficult to control, but hurt an application if left blank, for
example, "Describe your ideal job situation." Additionally, there was a worry that a
manager would connect the person picking up or turning in an application with the job
applicant, rather than looking at the resume characteristics alone. To generate a call-in, a
young woman randomly generated an entry in the telephone book. Since large firms tend
to have more entries in the telephone book than small firms, and certain industries, such
as law offices, tend to have multiple entries, call-ins tend to have a slight bias towards
generating these firms. However, they do a better job of generating small firms than
want-ads. The company was then called and asked, "Hello, my name is Elizabeth
Williams, I was wondering, do you have any entry-level jobs available?" If the person on
the phone did not understand, the caller followed with, "Are you hiring for any entry-
level positions?" If the person on the phone said no, the caller moved on to another
phone book entry. If the person on the phone said yes, the caller tried to elicit a fax
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number or email address and later generated a resume and sent it. If there was no fax or
email available, the caller first checked to see if there was an online application, and if
there was, she sent a resume via that method. Otherwise, the caller coded the company as
"no fax/email available" and generated another telephone book entry.
Response rates differ somewhat by method of application as shown in Appendix
Table 2. Want-ads are more likely to get both positive and interview responses than Call-
ins, faxes slightly more likely than emails. There are some occupational differences in
response rates between Massachusetts and Florida. For example, professional/technical
non healthcare positions, which are mostly preschool teaching positions, were 1.5 times
as likely to hire younger workers in Massachusetts, but there was a much smaller number
of positions advertised in Florida, so the sample size could not be compared. There was
no difference in age for hiring healthcare workers, mostly Licensed Nurse Practitioners
and Certified Nurse Assistants, in Massachusetts, but Florida healthcare agencies were
twice as likely to hire younger workers (results not shown). The composition of jobs
available differs as well, as can be seen under "firm characteristics" in Appendix Tables
l a and lb. A quarter of the jobs available in both metropolitan areas were clerical work,
but the Boston area was much more likely to hire sales workers, at 24.5% of openings
compared to 19.5% in the St. Petersburg-Tampa area. Entry-level professional, education
and managerial jobs were also more likely to be advertised in Massachusetts whereas
craftsman, operative, service and laborer jobs were more likely to be advertised in
Florida.
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Variables All
resume characteristics:
hsgrad 19
yrs of 10 in LF
typo
college
computer
volunteer
sport
other hobby
insurance
flexible
attendance
recent computer
relevant computer
age z
method of sending:
fax
email
online
firm characteristics:
EOE/AA
professional
education
health
manager
clerical
sales
craftsman
operative
service
laborer
Appendix Table la
Summary Statistics: Massachusetts
older younger 1959 1966 1971 1976 1986
71.561 1965.625 1980.667 1959.000 1966.000 1971.000 1976.000 1986.000
5.590
0.163
0.196
0.520
0.504
0.487
0.196
0.503
0.517
0.493
0.152
0.378
49.439
0.786
0.179
0.034
0.124
0.040
0.025
0.140
0.066
0.250
0.245
0.022
0.044
0.145
0.018
5.567
0.171
0.195
0.523
0.498
0.483
0.192
0.508
0.523
0.500
0.151
0.377
55.375
0.780
0.186
0.034
0.127
0.039
0.028
0.146
0.062
0.252
0.245
0.021
0.043
0.140
0.019
5.624
0.151
0.197
0.515
0.513
0.494
0.202
0.496
0.508
0.482
0.154
0.379
40.333
0.795
0.170
0.034
0.119
0.040
0.020
0.132
0.070
0.247
0.244
0.024
0.046
0.154
0.017
5.468
0.118
0.204
0.512
0.509
0.481
0.210
0.528
0.533
0.499
0.168
0.377
62
0.790
0.176
0.033
0.127
0.045
0.022
0.144
0.072
0.249
0.241
0.024
0.045
0.135
0.017
5.692
0.198
0.203
0.533
0.481
0.493
0.186
0.506
0.511
0.489
0.145
0.381
55
0.771
0.191
0.037
0.135
0.043
0.033
0.147
0.054
0.256
0.254
0.017
0.048
0.126
0.015
5.522
0.188
0.177
0.522
0.508
0.474
0.183
0.493
0.525
0.513
0.142
0.373
50
0.780
0.188
0.032
0.120
0.031
0.027
0.146
0.062
0.250
0.240
0.023
0.037
0.159
0.025
5.697
0.181
0.212
0.509
0.520
0.494
0.199
0.487
0.515
0.480
0.139
0.376
45
0.816
0.157
0.027
0.110
0.042
0.020
0.145
0.064
0.230
0.240
0.022
0.049
0.162
0.018
5.542
0.117
0.180
0.521
0.506
0.493
0.205
0.506
0.501
0.485
0.171
0.383
35
0.772
0.185
0.041
0.130
0.039
0.021
0.118
0.076
0.266
0.248
0.026
0.041
0.145
0.017
# obeservations
Notes:
4229 2560 1669
hs grad age
Older includes: hs1959
hs1 966
hs1 971
62
55
50
763 921 876 890 779
hs grad age
Younger includes: hs1 976
hs1986
45
35
46
Appendix Table lb
Summary Statistics: Florida
Variables All older younger 1959 1966 1971 1976 1986
resume characteristics:
hsgrad 1971.538 1965.654 1980.675 1959 1966 1971 1976 1986
yrs of 10 in LF 5.694 5.674 5.726 5.684 5.672 5.667 5.752 5.696
typo 0.259 0.264 0.252 0.206 0.282 0.296 0.288 0.211
college 0.186 0.190 0.179 0.183 0.207 0.180 0.159 0.201
computer 0.511 0.506 0.518 0.506 0.501 0.510 0.522 0.514
volunteer 0.494 0.494 0.493 0.523 0.478 0.484 0.484 0.502
sport 0.499 0.493 0.508 0.495 0.508 0.478 0.513 0.502
other hobby 0.183 0.179 0.188 0.189 0.177 0.173 0.188 0.188
insurance 0.500 0.505 0.493 0.536 0.484 0.496 0.484 0.502
flexible 0.510 0.515 0.502 0.513 0.495 0.536 0.511 0.492
attendance 0.500 0.496 0.505 0.508 0.499 0.483 0.526 0.482
recent computer 0.156 0.152 0.163 0.150 0.151 0.153 0.159 0.168
relevant computer 0.380 0.371 0.393 0.360 0.378 0.373 0.402 0.384
age 49.462 55.346 40.325 62 55 50 45 35
method of sending:
fax 0.837 0.839 0.834 0.831 0.839 0.847 0.830 0.838
email 0.134 0.136 0.129 0.145 0.134 0.132 0.137 0.120
online 0.029 0.024 0.037 0.024 0.028 0.022 0.033 0.042
firm characteristics:
EOE/AA 0.149 0.144 0.158 0.152 0.146 0.135 0.146 0.172
professional 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.010
education 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.003
health 0.148 0.150 0.144 0.142 0.165 0.144 0.140 0.149
manager 0.048 0.044 0.053 0.051 0.035 0.047 0.058 0.048
clerical 0.262 0.264 0.260 0.247 0.280 0.263 0.263 0.258
sales 0.195 0.189 0.205 0.204 0.180 0.185 0.187 0.226
craftsman 0.042 0.042 0.041 0.043 0.038 0.046 0.044 0.038
operative 0.081 0.081 0.079 0.078 0.085 0.081 0.097 0.059
service 0.173 0.176 0.169 0.180 0.161 0.185 0.165 0.174
laborer 0.035 0.038 0.030 0.044 0.041 0.031 0.029 0.032
# observations 3773 2295 1478 705 762 828 787 691
Notes:
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Appendix Table 2a
Response Percentage by Method of Delivery
Massachusetts Florida
Positive Interview # observations Positive Interview # observations
Fax
Want-Ad 0.09 0.05 2687 0.11 0.06 2508
Call-in 0.06 0.02 636 0.05 0.03 650
All 0.09 0.05 3323 0.10 0.05 3158
Email
Want-Ad 0.08 0.04 614 0.11 0.05 364
Call-in 0.01 0.01 145 0.06 0.04 140
All 0.07 0.03 759 0.10 0.05 504
Online
Want-Ad 0.18 0.11 28 0.13 0.13 16
Call-in 0.08 0.03 115 0.04 0.02 95
All 0.10 0.05 143 0.05 0.04 111
All
Want-Ad 0.09 0.05 3333 0.11 0.06 2888
Call-in 0.05 0.02 896 0.05 0.03 885
All 0.08 0.04 4229 0.10 0.05 3773
Notes:
Appendix Table 2b
Marginal Effect of EOE on Response Rate for Massachusetts
All Occupations Non-health Occupations
Variables Positive Interview Positive Interview
EOE/AA 0.044 0.027 0.018 0.007
(0.025) (0.019) (0.026) (0.017)
Over 50 -0.015 -0.018 -0.013 -0.016
(0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
EOE/AA*over 50 -0.009 0.004 -0.024 -0.010
(0.024) (0.019) (0.022) (0.016)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
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Chapter Two
State Age Protection Laws and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
2.1 Introduction
Although the hope is that anti-discrimination laws will raise employment and
wages for members of protected groups, a number of studies suggest that these laws may
be counter-productive. For example, Gruber (1994) finds that mandates which stipulated
that childbirth be covered comprehensively in health insurance plans caused a decrease in
wages of women of child bearing age. Similarly, DeLiere (2000), Acemoglu and Angrist
(2001), and Jolls and Prescott (2004), among others, find a negative effect on
employment prospects for disabled workers following the 1990 Americans with
Disabilities Act. In this paper I examine the impact of state and federal legislation meant
to protect older workers. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits
discrimination against older workers in hiring, laying off, firing, compensation, or other
conditions of employment.
This paper examines whether age discrimination laws have unintended
consequences for older workers. There are three margins upon which these laws can
affect older workers: firing, hiring and retirement. Employment may increase or decrease
for older workers depending on which margins are most affected by the laws. First, a
firm affected by these laws will be unlikely to outright fire an older worker for fear of a
lawsuit. However, it is very difficult to prove or detect discrimination in hiring, and thus
employers may be afraid to hire older workers who will be difficult to fire (Donohue and
Siegelman 1991). Finally, since the line between unemployment and retirement tends to
blur for older workers (Choi 2002), firms who wish to avoid being sued may increase
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retirement incentives for these workers, thus decreasing the employment of older
workers. At first examination, increasing retirement rates of older workers may seem as
if it benefits both the worker and the company. However, the worker may have actually
preferred to stay with the company rather than choose retirement. Because it is difficult
for older workers to find new employment, the possibility of losing one's job without the
retirement package is a worse prospect for the older worker who may feel that he or she
has no choice, than for the younger worker who has a higher probability of finding new
employment. Indeed, Schuster and Miller (1984) find that 31% of cases brought under
the ADEA before 1981 involved involuntary retirement.
This paper uses state age discrimination laws matched by state and year to the
March monthly CPS to look at retirement outcomes for protected workers. To investigate
the impact of hiring and job separation outcomes for older workers, I constructed
measures of separations and accessions by matching CPS rotation groups as in Bleakley
et al. (1999). My empirical strategy uses the assumption that, because of the EEOC
backlog, workers in states with their own age discrimination laws are more likely to be
affected by the federal law. Workers in states with age discrimination laws have almost
twice as long to file and their state FEP office can often process claims more quickly than
the EEOC. Thus, I compare workers in states with laws who are affected by the law and
workers in states with laws who are not affected by the law to those who are in states
without laws.
I find that ADEA laws, including state laws, had no negative effects (using CPS
March monthly data) on labor market outcomes before the 1968 federal law was enforced
and given to the EEOC in 1979. These laws also do not affect older women or
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minorities, possibly because these groups are granted stronger protections under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. After the 1978 legislation, white male workers over the age of 50 in
states with ADEA laws worked fewer weeks per year and were less likely to be hired or
separated from their jobs, but are more likely to be retired (perhaps involuntarily). These
findings suggest that firms do not wish to hire older workers most affected by the law, are
afraid to fire older workers, but remove older workers through incentives to retire in
states where lawsuits are less of a hurdle for the worker.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides
background information on the legal environment surrounding age discrimination laws,
including a brief literature review. Section III provides my empirical strategy. Section
IV gives information on data and descriptive statistics. Section V provides results,
including robustness checks. Section VI concludes.
2.2 Background
The first state age discrimination law came on the books in 1903 in Colorado. By
1960, eight states had age discrimination laws.43 Although the US Civil Service had
banned maximum hiring ages in federal employment in 1956 and legislated against age
discrimination in federal contracting in 1964, federal legislation protecting older workers
overall did not appear until 1967 with the introduction of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, or ADEA. The 1967 ADEA prohibited age based discrimination for
those aged 40-65 in firms with 20 or more workers. Under this act, employers were
barred from using age in hiring, laying off, firing, compensation, or other conditions of
43 I have not been able to find any pattern to the introduction of these laws. States with and without laws
look very similar across measured characteristics. In the robustness checks portion of the results section I
run a test as if states with laws had introduced them 5 years earlier and find no evidence of any underlying
differences between states that introduce and have not yet introduced laws.
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employment. It also prohibited employers from using age specific language in
advertising. Although Adams (2004) finds a small effect of the introduction of this law,
most researchers agree that the federal law had little effect until the 1978 amendment to
the ADEA44 (Neumark and Stock 1999). In 1978, congress extended the protected age
group to 40-70 and eliminated mandatory retirement for most federal employees. A
second major change, in terms of enforcement, came in 1979 when the Department of
Labor (and, for federal employment, the US Civil Service Commission) gave
administrative responsibility to the US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). Most researchers agree that this change strengthened the power of the ADEA
since the change came with an increase in resources and an increase in "pattern and
practice" lawsuits (Neumark 2001).
In 1986, congress amended the ADEA to eliminate the upper protected age range
for age discrimination, effectively eliminating mandatory retirement for all except in
cases where a safety issue related to age might be considered a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ), such as for pilots, or where the existence of job tenure would
impose an undue hardship on the employer, such as for professors.4 5 In 1990, the Older
Workers Benefits Protection Act (OWBPA) imposed restrictions on the financial tools
employers could use to induce worker retirement (Neumark 2001).
The procedure to file a claim under the ADEA is important, since with its large
backlog of cases, the EEOC rarely prosecutes claims itself. If a state has statutes, the
claimant must file with the state Fair Employment Practices (FEP) office within 300
44 Neumark and Stock (1999) note that the existence of the law may have given plaintiffs higher standing in
court even in the absence of enforcement mechanisms.
45 Ashenfelter and Card (2000) looked at the end of mandatory retirement for college faculty.
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days, otherwise the claimant must first file with the EEOC within 180 days.46 The EEOC
can then dismiss the claim, at which point the claimant may pursue a civil action in court,
or the EEOC can seek to settle or mediate. If the settlement or mediation is unsuccessful,
the EEOC can then sue, or if it chooses not to sue, the claimant may sue (Neumark 2001).
Over 95% of employment discrimination cases are brought by private attorneys, not the
EEOC. Additionally, only 8% of employment discrimination cases filed in federal court
proceed to the trial state (Gregory 2001). Since claimants have more time to file if their
state has a law, and, because the claim may be processed faster by the state FEP than the
backlogged EEOC, claimants in states with age discrimination laws have less of a hurdle
to suing than claimants in states without those laws.
Awards are limited to "make whole" status and lawyer fees, that is, the award
returns the plaintiff to where he or she would have been had he or she not been the
subject of discrimination. These awards include hiring, reinstatement or promotion, back
pay and restoration of benefits and lawyers fees. Attorney's fees often make up the bulk
of the payment by the firm. Unlike race and gender cases covered by the Civil Rights
Act (CRA), additional damages are not awarded except in cases involving willful
violation of law and these are limited to twice the amount of actual damages (Levine
1988, Gregory 2001). Thus, suing under the CRA may be more attractive to women and
minorities, but the ADEA is the best option for older white men.47
The motivation behind the ADEA seems to be that employers incorrectly perceive
older workers to be less productive or unwilling to make modest adjustments to
accommodate them. Additionally, lawmakers may worry that capable individual older
46 "For ADEA charges, only state laws extend the filing limit to 300 days."
http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/overview charge_filing.html
47 The Americans with Disabilities Act was not introduced until 1991.
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workers are not granted opportunities based on beliefs about average characteristics of
the elderly. Although the labor market fortunes of older workers tend to be better than
those of younger workers, older workers are less likely to find employment after being
separated from a job (Diamond and Hausman 1984). When older workers do find new
jobs, they are clustered into a smaller set of industries and occupations than younger
workers (Hutchens 1988).
The majority of people who sue under the ADEA are white male middle
managers or professionals over the age of 50. Employment termination in the form of
wrongful discharge and involuntary retirement, not differential hiring, is the cause of
most suits. It is thus possible that the ADEA acts as a form of employment protection. At
the beginning of EEOC enforcement, 14% of claimants were women. By 1995 this
number had risen to only 30% (Donohue and Siegelman 1991, Gregory 2001, Schuster
and Miller 1984). As mentioned before, it may be that women and minorities have
greater protection under the Civil Rights Act, which also allows punitive damages. Thus
my identification strategy focuses on white men over the age of 50, who are most likely
to sue under the law.
This paper is the first to examine the impact of the ADEA from its early years
through a significant time period after its enforcement. It also uses yearly CPS data and
examines the effects on many segments of the labor force, not just those over or under the
age of retirement. Adams (2004) looks at the introduction of the federal law in 1968 and
finds an increase in employment for those protected by the federal law and a decrease for
those older than the protected ages. His identification strategy relies on the assumption
that states with laws prior to the introduction of the ADEA are not affected by its
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passage, an assumption which may or may not be valid since the 1968 ADEA had no
enforcement mechanism. There is also some question about the validity of the early CPS
which Adams uses in his pre-period. Neumark and Stock (1999) look at censuses from
1940 to 1980, and thus have only one data point after the enforcement of the ADEA.48
The census may not be the best source of data to examine the impact of these laws since
it cannot follow year to year changes.
The end of mandatory retirement in 1986 and 1994 has been more extensively
studied than other aspects of the ADEA. Till von Wachter (2002) looks at the shift of
mandatory retirement to age 70 in 1978 and its end in 1986 and finds that the labor force
participation of workers age 65 and older increases by 10 to 20% by 1986. Mitchell and
Luzadis (1988) find that in 1960, pension plans rewarded delayed retirement, but by the
1980s, union plans actively encouraged early retirement. However, non-union plans still
rewarded delayed retirement. Ashenfelter and Card (2000) show that the abolition of
retirement for college professors in 1994 reduced retirement for those age 70 and 71.
Although the end of mandatory retirement is important, it does not tell the story of the
entire effect of the ADEA, particularly the consequences of this legislation on older
workers wishing to be hired or promoted and the effects on workers who are over the age
of 50 (and thus "old") but too young for mandatory retirement to have affected them.
This paper fills these gaps in the literature.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
To study the effect of state age discrimination laws, I use an OLS Differences in
Differences specification:
48 1 took Neumark and Stock's list of state laws and updated them. In some cases I made corrections, but
these corrections to their list were for laws after 1980 and thus do not affect their results.
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(1)Yit =Xifl +4 2 (Hst *Aover5 )+3(H * A under5 o)+0 +0 + + 4 st +,Ai 3 + s(, ~ )l't4 C) -is4Ct4Ss
where i denotes individuals and t denotes time; Yit is weeks worked, a dummy indicating
employed, a dummy indicating retirement, a dummy indicating hired this month, or a
dummy indicating being separated from a job this month; Xi is a set of controls including
a dummy for married and a dummy for high school graduate. H is an indicator that is
equal to one if the state s in which the individual resides has an age discrimination law in
year t. Aer 5 is an indicator equal to one if the individual is over the age of 50, and
A 'der50 is an indicator equal to one if the individual is age 50 or under. 09t is a set of
time dummies; qP is a set of state dummies; a is a full set of age dummies; and st is a
state specific linear time trend. The assumption behind this strategy is that it is easier for
workers to sue, and thus to enforce age discrimination laws, in states that have their own
age discrimination laws than in states which do not. Thus workers over the age of 50 in
states with laws will be more affected than workers in states without laws.
Equation (1) varies somewhat from the standard differences in differences
equation which would be:
Yit: =Xyl +y2 (Hs5t)+ y3 (Hst * Aie 5O) + t + Ps a +4- st + - ist
where y3 is the effect of the law on workers over the age of 50 compared to workers
under the age of 50 in states with laws. This equation is equivalent to equation (1), in
that 2 = 72+73 and 3 = y2. The reason for using equation (1), which compares
workers over and under the age of 50 in states with laws to workers in states without
laws, as the specification, is that one can more clearly see the effects of the law on the
two different age groups in the sample. 2 is the effect of having a law on workers over
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the age of 50 and P3 is the effect of having a law on workers age 50 and under, relative to
workers in states without laws. Age 50 was chosen as the age cutoff because white men
over 50 are most likely to sue under the law.
A second possible way of identifying is through a Differences in Differences in
Differences strategy using women as a second control group. Since women have more to
gain from suing under the Civil Rights Act, which allows punitive damages, they may be
less likely to sue under age discrimination laws. Additionally, since women's attachment
to the labor force is weaker than men's, employers may figure that women will leave or
retire on their own before they become a liability due to their age. Finally, women in
early cohorts, and thus older women, tend to be much less litigious than men and women
in later cohorts. Thus employers may not see older women as constituting as much of a
threat due to age discrimination laws as they do men. My strategy is:
over 50 une 50 o v r5
Yit = i + 2 (M * Hs * A +3 (Mi *H * A under50) + 4 (M * A over5O) +
,/5(M * Auner°) + 6(M * Aover50) + ,7( H * A°ver5) + , 8( H * Ander5o) + (2)
+ t + (P s + s a + st ist
where i denotes individuals, t denotes time; it is weeks worked, a dummy indicating
employed, a dummy indicating retirement, a dummy indicating hired this month, or a
dummy indicating being separated from a job this month; Xi is a set of controls including
a dummy for married and a dummy for high school graduate. M is an indicator which
equals if the individual is male. H is an indicator that is equal to one if the state s in
which the individual resides has an age discrimination law in year t. Ae 5O is an
indicator equal to one if the individual is over the age of 50, and Ander 5 is an indicator
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equal to one if the individual is age 50 or under. 0t is a set of time dummies; q(, is a set
of state dummies; a is a full set of age dummies; and (st is a linear state time trend. The
assumptions behind this strategy are that it is easier for workers to sue, and thus to
enforce age discrimination laws, in states that have their own age discrimination laws
than in states which do not and that women are less likely to be affected by these laws
than men. Thus men over the age of 50 in states with will be more affected than either
workers in states without laws or than women.
Finally, I try a more stringent identification strategy in terms of possible state and
time trends by allowing state times year effects:
Yit = 1(Hs * Aiser5o) + St + P +a + q * ot + 50s (3)
with variables defined as before.
2.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The first sample I use to look at the impact of age discrimination laws is drawn
from the 1968-1991 March CPS and is limited to white men aged 25 to 85. I break this
set up into two smaller sets, one covering 1968-1977 and the other covering 1978-1991,
because congress's committee reported on the ADEA in 197749 (amendments followed in
1978 and enforcement by the EEOC in 1979), and because of changes in the CPS
beginning in 1976. The impact of the ADEA on employment levels is evaluated by
looking at data on weeks worked during the calendar year preceding the March income
supplement. The impact on wages is measured using the average weekly earnings,
computed using annual earnings data. After 1979, the CPS prompted respondents to be
sure to include overtime pay, tips, bonuses, commissions, and money from employers
49 http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=472&invol=353
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other than the primary employer. The impact on retirement and labor force participation
is measured using the self-reported retirement and labor force coding from the CPS
employment status variable. The second sample I use is a matched monthly CPS, which
is matched as in Bleakley et al. (1999). I use their algorithm to match job flow variables
in order to measure the impact of the ADEA on hiring and job separation outcomes.
CPS questions about weeks worked and income refer to the previous year. The
year reported in the tables and figures is the year the CPS was taken, not the year referred
to. Questions about labor force status and retirement refer to the respondent's main
occupation in the previous week. From 1968 to 1976 in the early period, the CPS does
not identify all states but groups some of them together. For state groups in which all
states in the group have the same law status for the year, I code these as having or not
having the law depending on status. If any state in the group does not have the same
status as the others for the year, I drop these states for the years in which they disagree.
The basis fr state laws was taken from Neumark and Stock (1999) and checked against
several secondary sources. When Neumark and Stock (1999) disagreed with the
secondary sources, these laws were checked against primary sources from Westlaw and
from microfiche and hard copies of compiled state laws. Additionally, the list was
updated for years not in Neumark and Stock using Monthly Law Review updates and
Westlaw.
Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1. As mentioned before, the universe
is restricted to white males. As workers get older, they are less likely to be unemployed
and more likely to be out of the labor force. The employment rate, weekly wage, and
total income increase by age until age 45 in the early sample and age 50 in the later
59
sample, after which they begin to drop. Men in the set are more likely to be married as
they get older until their mid-60s. Older cohorts are also less likely to be high school
graduates.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Employment, Wage, andRetirementEffects
Figure la plots average weeks worked by white men age 25-49 and those age 50-
84 in states with and without laws. The number of weeks worked in Figure la is taken as
the average of the midpoint of intervalled weeks worked per year. In the later period,
there was a redesign in the CPS so that the actual number of weeks worked was recorded,
and this is shown in Figure lb. The number of weeks worked by older men has been
declining since 1979 or 1980, although there was a slight uptick in weeks worked by men
in states without their own laws in 1984. This decrease is sharper for older men in states
with laws and begins in 1977 rather than 1979 for these states. This decline suggests that
the possibility of a new enforcement mechanism may have had an effect before the
enforcement actually came in place in 1979 in states which were more aware of age
discrimination legislation. Weeks worked by younger men dropped as well from 1979 to
1983 and then increased through the rest of the 1980s. In general men in states without
laws worked more weeks per year than those in states with laws.
Table 2 reports ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (1). The
universe is white men between the ages of 25 and 85, inclusive. The dependent variables
are weeks worked, log weekly earnings and retired.50 The controls in these regressions
are dummies for married and high school graduate, and a set of age dummies, state
50 The coefficient reported for retired is the marginal effect of the probit.
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dummies and year dummies. 5' Regressions are clustered on state. The coefficients of
interest are over50* havelaw, which is the interaction of the observation being age 50 or
over and being in a state with a law, and under50*havelaw, which is the interaction of the
observation being under the age of 50 and being in a state with a law. People in states
with laws have more time to file a claim and can work with the state FEP agency rather
than directly with the overburdened EEOC; thus they have less of a hurdle to file a
lawsuit. Some states with laws also protect workers in firms with fewer than 20 workers.
Even though the law covers workers over 40, in practice white men over the age of 50 are
the most likely to sue. The table also reports estimates from specifications including a
linear time trend interacted with state.
The results in Table 2 suggest a substantial and statistically significant decline in
weeks worked per year for people over the age of 50 after it was announced that the
ADEA would begin to be enforced in 1978. For example, in Table 2A, column 1 shows a
drop of between -1.1 and -1.5 weeks worked for older white men, those over 50, in states
with age discrimination laws and essentially no effect on white men under 50 in those
states. In the early period, there is no effect on weeks worked for either older or younger
workers, though this lack of finding may be due to measurement error in weeks worked
per year, since prior to 1976, they were only reported in intervals.
Panel 2B reports estimates on log weekly wages of white men 25-50 and 51-85 in
states with and without laws. Once state trends are added, there is no evidence of any
effect on either older or younger workers in the early period, although again, since the
variable, weekly wages, is manufactured from weeks worked and not all states are
51 Adding college graduate instead of high school graduate as a control changes the coefficient on
over50*havelaw to range between -1.045 without a state year trend to -1.37 with a state trend, compared to
-1.5 and -1.16 respectively.
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included in the early period, this may be an artifact of the data.5 2 In the later period, there
is a positive effect on wages of older workers in states with laws, but this effect is not
significant. Thus there is little evidence for a wage effect of age discrimination laws.
Panel 2C reports estimates on self-reported retirement of white men over and
under 50 in states with and without laws. Note that unlike the weeks worked and income
questions, the retirement question is asked about the previous week, rather than the
previous year. In the early period, the effect on retirement is positive and just barely
significant at the 5% level for older workers, although this effect goes away when state
trends are added to the framework. In the later period, older workers are about 4% more
likely to retire in states with laws and younger workers are 1.6% less likely to retire and
these results are significant at the 1% level. Thus age discrimination laws encourage
retirement. This effect could be through two different channels. It could be that
companies prefer to offer retirement packages to older workers rather than laying them
off or firing them, thus decreasing the chance of a lawsuit. Alternatively, it could be that
unemployed older workers who face decreased chances of re-employment prefer to refer
to themselves as retired rather than unemployed.
Robustness Checks
Although Figure 1 suggests that the possibility of the enforcement of the federal
age discrimination law may have affected employment of older workers in states with
laws as early as 1977, when committees reported on the ADEA, an argument can be
made for using the year 1978, when the enforcement was announced, or 1979, when the
enforcement actually took place as the start year for the later period. Results using these
52 No evidence is found for an effect in the early period using annual wages either, suggesting that the lack
of an effect on weeks worked may be real and not just an artifact of the interval data and missing states.
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later cut-off dates can be found in Table 3. Again, the age range refers to the dates the
CPS was taken, and thus refers to the earlier year for questions on weeks worked and
income. These results are substantively the same as those from 1978-1991, although in
general the magnitude of the coefficients is somewhat smaller. Additionally, the results
for weeks worked per year lose significance at the 5% level once state trends are included
in the regression.
The age 85 was chosen as the top age in order to allow a generous top age
specification while still eliminating possible outliers. The typical person who sues under
the ADEA, however, is a white male between the ages of 50 and 59. To test for
sensitivity to the top age used, I run separate regressions using topcodes of 75, 65, and
59. These results can be found in Table 4. Again, there is no evidence of an age
discrimination law effect on relative wages for these smaller age universes. The
magnitude of the coefficient of havelaw * 50 drops for both weeks worked per year and
retirement as the age universe is trimmed, suggesting there might be a stronger effect on
older workers. Weeks worked per year is no longer significant when state time trends are
added once 75-84 year olds are removed and loses significance entirely once the universe
is restricted below 65, although this result is not unexpected since the universe is smaller.
Retirement remains significant for the 25-65 year olds but drops when the range is
restricted to those under 60.
Similar regressions shown in Table 5, looking at women and minority groups,
found no effect of age discrimination laws on weeks worked. Women and protected
minority groups are afforded greater protection under the Civil Rights Act (CRA) and can
be awarded punitive damages in addition to "make whole" damages from the CRA, but
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not the ADEA. Thus employers may not worry about age for these groups as they are
more likely to be sued under the CRA and would have to pay out a larger settlement
under the CRA. Additionally, I may be finding no effect because employers may believe
that, since women have weaker labor force participation, they may leave before a lawsuit
becomes an issue. Finally, women in early cohorts sue less than other groups. Sample
sizes for blacks are small and are even smaller for other minority groups and thus may
not be big enough to pick up an effect of age laws. I do find a positive effect on weekly
wages for black men of all ages in states with laws once state time trends are added in,
but that may be a spurious result. I also find an effect on retirement for these groups
similar to that of white men and of a slightly larger magnitude. Since retirement is self-
defined, it may be that women whose husbands have retired now call themselves retired
as well. There may also be spillover effects of encouraging older white men to retire; it is
not legal to offer different retirement incentives based on race or gender.
Older white men in middle-management positions are most likely to sue.
Therefore it may be of interest to break up the set by college education, since managers
are more likely to be college educated. Columns 5-8 of Table 5 report results for white
men by college graduation. In table A, results on weeks worked for both of these
groups are very similar to those of the whole sample, with the coefficient of
havelaw*over50 decreasing in magnitude and significance with state trends for the group
of non-college graduates but increasing in magnitude and significance for those with a
college education. If there is a state-time trend to weeks worked that varies by education,
then this would suggest that age discrimination laws do hurt those in demographic groups
that are more likely to sue. However, as can be seen in table SC, retirement effects of
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state laws are strongest for those who are not college graduates. In states where it is
easier to sue, older non-college graduates are 4.1 to 4.5% more likely to be retired,
significant at the 1% level, but college graduates are only 2% more likely to be retired
and this finding is not significant. This difference may be due to the smaller size of
college graduates in the sample, or it may be that college graduate men are less likely to
take retirement packages when offered or to claim retirement when unemployed.
Table 6A reports OLS estimates of equation (2). The universe is all white men
and women between the ages of 25 and 85. The dependent variable is weeks worked.
The controls in these regressions are dummies for married and high school graduate, and
a set of age dummies, state dummies and year dummies. Regressions are clustered on
state. The coefficients of interest are male*over5O*havelaw, which is the interaction of
the observation being male, age 50 or over and being in a state with a law, and male*
under5O*havelaw, which is the interaction of the observation being male, under the age
of 50 and being in a state with a law. Women are less likely to sue under age
discrimination laws than men, and as explained above, men in states with laws have less
of a hurdle to suing than men in states without laws.
The results in Table 6A agree substantially with the Differences in Differences
results for older men using having a law as identification in Table 2. There is still no
significant effect of laws for either group prior to the discussion of federal enforcement of
the law. In the later period, the magnitude for older men is somewhat larger than the
largest estimate in Table 2, with men in states with laws working almost 1.7 fewer weeks
using women and not having a law as controls. The triple difference for men under the
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age of 50 is negative here whereas in the earlier calculation its sign depended on the
inclusion of state trends, though again it is not significant.
Table 6B reports OLS estimates of equation (3). The universe is white men
between the ages of 25 and 85. The dependent variable is weeks worked. The controls in
these regressions are dummies for married and high school graduate, and a set of age
dummies, state dummies and year dummies. Regressions are clustered on state. The
coefficients of interest is havelaw*over50, which is the interaction of the observation
being age 50 or over and being in a state with a law. These results also find a negative
effect on weeks worked for older workers, with older workers working about 1.1 fewer
weeks in states with laws. These results are within the bounds of those found by equation
(1) presented in Table 2.
On average, there is little clear evidence of an age discrimination law effect on the
relative wages of older workers. Therefore the rest of this paper focuses on a further
investigation of the employment and labor force participation effects, and the analysis is
limited to the demographic groups for which the evidence for employment effects is
strongest-white men between the ages of 25 and 85.
Endogeneity of state laws
To test for the possible endogeneity of state laws, in addition to adding state and
year effects and trends, I run a specification check looking at the weeks worked outcome
at a point 5 years before each state law was passed. The assumption is that employers do
not know that a law will be passed prohibiting age discrimination 5 years prior to the law.
No evidence is found that having a law in 5 years affects employment or hiring of either
older or younger workers. The coefficient for weeks worked per year for older workers
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ranges from -0.091 (with no controls) with a standard error (SE) of 0.836 to -0.529 (with
controls and a state trend) with an SE of 0.714. Coefficients for younger workers range
from -0.330 with an SE of (0.570) to 0.310 with an SE of (0.824). Thus there is no
evidence that the introduction of state laws is related to something that directly affects the
differential employment of older and younger workers using this test.
2.5.2 The Impact ofAge Discrimination Laws on Hiring and Separations
Workers may also be working fewer weeks per year not just because they are
more likely to retire but also because they are having difficulty finding work once they
have separated from a previous job. Additionally, the law may be helping workers by
decreasing fires and layoffs for older workers, since employers do not want to be sued. I
used matched CPS rotations groups for the entire year to investigate the effect of age
discrimination laws on hiring and separation rates (see Bleakley et al. (1999) for a
detailed description of the match). An accession (hire) is recorded when someone who
was not employed in month m is employed in month m+l. Similarly, an individual is
coded as having experienced a separation in month m if he is employed in any month m
and not in month m+l (individuals employed in December and not in January are coded
as hired or separated in the January year). This definition includes people who move
from being employed to no longer being in the labor force as separated, and thus captures
those who have voluntarily retired in addition to those subject to layoffs, fires, and other
quits. Neither hires nor separations include people who change jobs without leaving
employment. These measures of accessions and separations are the same as those used
by Bleakley et al.(1999).
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As theory would predict, I find that older workers in states with laws are less
likely to be hired than workers in states without laws. I also find that workers are less
likely to be separated from their jobs, though these results are not significant. Results of
a probit using equation (2) with Hired and Separated as outcome variables can be found
in Table 7. Workers over the age of 50 in states with laws are 5-7% less likely to be
hired than workers in states without laws. There is also a small but not significant
positive effect on hiring for workers under the age of 50 in these states. Results on job
separations are not as clear. There is a trend of reduced job separations for workers over
the age of 50 in states with laws and increased job separations for workers under the age
of 50, but these results are not significant at the 5% level. Since separations include
retirements, which are more likely for older workers in states with laws, I should be
picking up two separate effects: increased retirement incentives and decreased firing and
layoffs.53 Still, I find that older workers in states with laws are 1-3% less likely to be
separated than workers in states without, and this effect is probably a lower bound.
2.6 Concluding Comments
Employment of workers over the age of 50 has dropped since the ADEA was
enforced in 1979. This drop is greater for workers in states where lawsuits are less of a
hurdle for older workers, those states with their own age discrimination laws. Workers
over the age of 50 in states with laws work between 1 and 1.5 fewer weeks per year than
workers in states without laws. This drop in weeks worked may seem high, but it is
comparable to the effect that Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) find for the disabled after the
53 Simply limiting to people who do not say they are retired will not fix this effect since many people who
are actually unemployed would call themselves retired for status reasons (Choi 2002).
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introduction of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1991, where weeks worked
for disabled men fall 1.4 weeks in 1993 and another 1.5 weeks between 1993 and 1995.
Retirement has also increased for these older workers. Older workers in states
with laws are 4% more likely to consider themselves retired than workers in states
without. Hiring has decreased significantly for older workers in states where it is easier
to sue; older workers are 5-7% less likely to be hired in states with laws. Finally,
separations have dropped, though not at a significant level.
I find no decline in the employment or retirement for younger workers, non-white
workers and female workers. A possible explanation for the difference in findings by
race and gender is that before the advent of the ADEA, female and minority workers
were already protected by the Civil Rights Act (CRA), which allows for more damages;
white men over the age of 50 are the most likely to sue under the ADEA. Additionally,
since these groups are not as strongly attached to the labor market, employers may think
that they will leave their jobs before possible productivity declines due to age become an
issue.
Since the ADEA provides a form of employment protection, it should lead to a
lower separation rate for older workers. There does seem to be a protection benefit of
this sort, although the results are not conclusive. However, there is also a large effect on
increased retirements for these older workers. Employers appear to be reacting to age
discrimination legislation and threats of lawsuits by failing to hire older workers, being
less likely to fire or lay-off older workers but by trying to remove older workers through
retirement incentives. In general, it appears that these age protection laws have had very
little effect on workers under the age of 50.
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TABLE 2
Initial Results
A. Weeks Worked per Year
1968-1977 1978-1991
(1) (2) (3) (4)
havelaw*over50 -0.123 0.180 -1.500 -1.157
(0.575) (0.657) (0.535)** (0.527)*
havelaw*under50 -0.083 0.219 -0.010 0.326
(0.744) (0.474) (0.441) (0.510)
Observations 215,912 215,912 558,873 558,873
R-squared 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.42
B. Log of Weekly Wages
havelaw*over50 0.081 0.052 0.026 0.074
(0.039)* (0.036) (0.024) (0.038)
havelaw*under50 0.001 -0.029 -0.007 0.040
(0.032) (0.032) (0.018) (0.022)
Observations 160,986 160,986 396,442 396,442
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.16
C. Retirement
havelaw*over50 0.016 0.018 0.042 0.040
(0.010) (0.012) (0.009)** (0.008)**
havelaw*under50 -0.014 -0.011 -0.015 -0.018
(0.015) (0.013) (0.004)** (0.006)**
Observations 215989 215989 558,947 558,947
R-squared 0.48 0.48 0.53 0.53
State-year trends? no yes no yes
NOTES. -- Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The table
reports OLS havelaw * over 50 interactions in regressions that include
married, high school graduate, age dummies, year dummies, and
state dummies. Regressions are clustered on state. The marginal of
the Probit coefficient is reported in panel C. Years in charts
refer to CPS year. Weeks worked and wage information refer
to the previous year, thus 1967-1976 and 1977-1990.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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TABLE 3
Results by Varying Enforcement Yeal
A. Weeks Worked per Year
1979-1991 1980-1991
(1) (2) (3) (4)
havelaw*over50 -1.269 -0.775 -1.336 -0.753
(0.564)* (0.536) (0.572)* (0.543)
havelaw*under50 -0.170 0.323 -0.114 0.469
(0.481) (0.467) (0.550) (0.412)
Observations 522,020 522,020 485,330 485,330
R-squared 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42
B. Log of Weekly Wages
havelaw*over50 0.021 0.078 0.010 0.063
(0.024) (0.042) (0.024) (0.042)
havelaw*under50 -0.015 0.041 -0.019 0.034
(0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028)
Observations 370,010 370,010 343,643 343,643
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16
C. Retirement
havelaw*over50 0.042 0.038 0.038 0.032
(0.010)** (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.008)**
havelaw*under50 -0.013 -0.017 -0.013 -0.018
(0.003)** (0.005)** (0.004)** (0.006)**
Observations 610,730 610,730 484,313 484,313
R-squared 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54
State-year trends? no yes no yes
NOTES. -- Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The table
reports OLS havelaw * over 50 interactions in regressions that include
married, high school graduate, age dummies, year dummies, and
state dummies. Regressions are clustered on state. The marginal of the
Probit coefficient is reported for panel C. Years in charts refer to CPS
year. Weeks worked and wage information refer to the previous year,
thus 1978-1990 and 1979-1990.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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TABLE 4
Results by Varying Top Age Tail: 1978-1991
A. Weeks Worked per Year
25-59 25-64 25-74
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
havelaw*over50 -0.429 -0.374 -0.921 -0.649 -1.471 -1.112
(0.459) (0.462) (0.531) (0.553) (0.541)** (0.559)
havelaw*under50 -0.303 -0.240 -0.111 0.162 -0.034 0.321
(0.427) (0.376) (0.438) (0.443) (0.434) (0.515)
Observations 427,774 427,774 477,124 477,124 535,164 535,164
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.16 0.16 0.36 0.36
B. Log of Weekly Wages
havelaw*over50 0.012 0.066 0.015 0.071 0.021 0.080
(0.027) (0.034) (0.024) (0.039) (0.024) (0.042)
havelaw*under50 -0.017 0.037 -0.013 0.043 -0.013 0.045
(0.022) (0.017)* (0.022) (0.021)* (0.021) (0.024)
Observations 333,097 333,097 357,254 357,254 368,295 368,295
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.15
C. Retirement
havelaw*over50 0.004 0.004 0.017 0.016 0.037 0.034
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.009)** (0.008)**
havelaw*under50 -0.002 -0.002 -0.008 -0.009 -0.013 -0.017
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)** (0.003)** (0.004)** (0.006)**
Observations 427,830 427,830 477,188 477,188 535,232 535,232
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.22 0.22 0.47 0.47
State-year trends? no yes no yes no yes
NOTES. -- Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The table reports OLS
havelaw * over 50 interactions in regressions that include married, high school
graduate, age dummies, year dummies, and state dummies. Regressions are
clustered on state. The marginal of the Probit coefficient is reported in panel C
Years in charts refer to CPS year. Weeks worked and wage information refer
to the previous year, thus 1977-1990.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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TABLE 6
Alternative Identification Strategies
Weeks Worked
A. D-D-D Women and Havelaw
male*over50*havelaw
male*under50*havelaw
male*over50
male*under50
havelaw*over50
havelaw*under50
Observations
R-squared
1968-1977
(1) (2
0.366 0.366
(0.673) (0.67,
1.347 1.348
(0.911) (0.91
15.820 15.81
(0.671)** (0.67
21.468 21.46
(0.655)** (0.65:
0.250 0.248
(0.425) (0.38
-1.058 -1.05'
(0.831) (0.75,
460122 4601
0.37 0.37
)
4)
2)
8
1)*
7
5)*
8)
7
4)
22
1978-1991
(3) (4)
-1.677 -1.675
(0.552)** (0.550)**
-1.558 -1.555
(0.890) (0.889)
12.221 12.218
* (0.548)** (0.546)**
14.099 14.096
* (0.812)** (0.810)**
-0.370 0.161
(0.375) (0.397)
0.735 1.266
(0.412) (0.774)
1179758 1179758
0.36 0.36
B. Havelaw * Over50 with State*Time
havelaw*over50 0.730 -1.151
(0.884) (0.485)*
Observations 460122 1179758
R-squared 0.19 0.30
State-year trends? no yes no yes
NOTES. -- Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Panel A
reports OLS male * havelaw * over 50 interactions in regressions that
include married, high school graduate, age dummies, year dummies,
and state dummies. Panel B reports OLS havelaw * over 50
interactions in regressions that include married, high school graduate,
age dummies, year dummies, and state dummies. Regressions are
clustered on state. Years in charts refer to CPS year. Weeks worked
refers to the previous year, thus 1967-1976 and 1977-1990.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
78
TABLE 7
Results on Hiring/Separation Margins: 1978-1991
A. Hired
(1) (2) (3) (4)
havelaw*over50 -0.0680 -0.0548 -0.0714 -0.0577
(0.0213)** (0.0211)** (0.0240)** (0.0247)*
havelaw*under50 0.0496 0.0455 0.0457 0.0420
(0.0311) (0.0306) (0.0221)* (0.0222)
Observations 4351023 4351023 4351023 4351023
B. Separated
havelaw*over50 -0.0325 -0.0209 -.0258 -0.0135
(.0213) (0.0209) (0.0275) (0.0274)
havelaw*under50 0.0747 0.0707 0.0805 0.0771
(0.0364)* (0.0363) (0.0483) (0.0489)
Observations 4351023 4351023 4351023 4351023
Controls? no yes no yes
State-year trends? no no yes yes
NOTES. -- Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The table
reports the marginal coefficient of havelaw * over 50 interactions in
probits that include married, high school graduate, age dummies,
year dummies, and state dummies. Marginal effects are reported.
(OLS regressions look very similar).
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Chapter Three
Alleviating Job-Lock? Evidence from a Public Health Care Expansion
(with Melissa A. Boyle (MIT))
3.I Introduction
In the United States, unlike in other industrialized nations, the provision of health
insurance is characterized by a pooling mechanism that ties insurance to employment.
Over ninety percent of private health insurance in the U.S. is employer-provided (Gruber
and Madrian, 2002). While firms provide a convenient means of grouping employed
individuals in a manner not systematically related to health, it has long been a concern
that tying health insurance to employment may have unintended negative consequences.
If workers alter their labor supply and retirement decisions because of fears over losing
health insurance coverage, or if firms are reluctant to hire certain types of workers (for
example, older workers) because of expectations about these workers' insurance costs,
inefficiencies may result. If health insurance does impede job mobility, a result that has
been termed "job-lock," the most productive employer-employee matches may not be
achieved.
Since the early 1990s, a large literature has emerged examining the economic
consequences of tying health insurance to employment. While this literature has
established a clear relationship between health insurance and labor supply choices, it has
suffered from a particular limitation. Because such a substantial proportion of the group
insurance market in the United States is tied to employment, it is difficult to find
individuals with outside sources of health insurance that are not in some way related to
the individuals' employment decisions. Thus, while the consensus in the literature is that
reductions in labor mobility result from tying health insurance to employment, the
magnitude of this problem has yet to be clearly established.
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In addition, the literature has not fully considered whether the introduction of
government-sponsored health care may alleviate job-lock. The expansion of public
health care programs in the United States will potentially affect the labor supply
decisions of program beneficiaries. If workers have an alternative source of health care
rather than depending solely on employer-provided insurance, their job mobility may
increase.
This paper exploits a change in health care coverage for United States veterans to
examine the impact of health insurance on labor supply. A major expansion in both the
services offered and the population covered by the Department of Veterans Affairs health
care system during the mid-1990s presents a unique opportunity to study the introduction
of an exogenous source of health care coverage that is unrelated to employment. This
setup both provides a means of cleanly identifying the extent of job-lock, and also
demonstrates the potential labor supply effects of expanding other public health insurance
programs.
3.2 Predicted Effects of Insurance on Labor Supply
If health insurance were a homogeneous good, firms providing such non-
monetary compensation could uniformly reduce wages by the cost of the insurance for all
workers choosing to accept such a benefit. In this case, workers could receive the same
benefit at the exact same cost in any employment situation, and no labor market
distortions would arise. In reality, however, insurance packages vary considerably across
firms. This variation arises, in part, from differences across employers in the cost of
providing health care coverage. These costs typically vary according to firms'
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experience ratings or projected future health expenditures, which depend on factors such
as firm size and worker characteristics. Additionally, while health care costs vary
substantially across individuals, employers only qualify for favorable tax treatment on
health insurance if most workers within the firm are offered equivalent benefits packages.
Firms are therefore typically constrained to offering the same package (at the same price)
to all employees. For these reasons, health insurance benefits are often not comparable
across firms, and workers may not switch to more productive employment situations
because of preferences across insurance packages.
For prime-aged workers, health insurance therefore has the potential to impact
labor supply in a number of ways. Reluctance to change jobs may result from
preferences for the current employer's insurance benefits, and may also arise from fears
about the potential effects of a temporary loss of insurance coverage. If coverage lapses
while individuals are between jobs, this leaves workers vulnerable to pre-existing
conditions exclusions. Additionally, some firms that provide employee health insurance
have a waiting period from the start of employment until the time that health insurance
benefits become available.
In addition to slowing job mobility, these factors will likely reduce the number of
individuals moving into self-employment (since insurance coverage purchased outside
the group market is much more expensive). Workers may also be less likely to choose
part-time work as a result of the tying of health insurance benefits to employment.
Because most part-time jobs do not provide the same benefits as full-time jobs, workers
may choose to work full-time to retain health care coverage, even if they would prefer to
move into part-time work.
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For older workers, health insurance has the same implications as described for
younger individuals, and also potentially impacts retirement decisions. As workers age,
there are two opposing influences which may affect such a decision. Because older
individuals tend to encounter more health problems, work may become more difficult,
strengthening the incentive to retire. At the same time, with the increased likelihood of
declining health, these individuals may be more concerned about maintaining health
insurance coverage in case of large medical expenses. In surveys, older individuals
frequently state that they will postpone retirement until they become Medicare-eligible at
age 65, even though they would actually prefer to retire earlier (Gruber & Madrian 2002).
Additionally, older workers who wish to transition into retirement through part-time work
or self-employment may be less likely to do so because they do not want to lose their
employer-provided health insurance coverage.
Eligibility for public health care programs has the potential to alleviate many of
the possible consequences described above. Public health care will provide beneficiaries
with coverage if they are between jobs or if they choose to move into part-time work or
self-employment. It will allow individuals wishing to retire before age 65 to do so
without sacrificing their health care coverage. Finally, depending on the generosity of a
particular public plan, such insurance may be used to fill gaps in employer-provided
plans, if an individual's optimal productivity match does not provide the preferred
insurance package.
An extensive literature has examined the impact of employer-provided health
insurance on the various labor supply decisions described above.54 Papers examining the
impact on prime-aged workers often focus on married individuals (most often wives), and
54 For a complete review of the literature, see Gruber and Madrian (2002).
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compare those with health insurance through their spouses' employers to those without.
These studies generally find that the availability of spousal health insurance reduces labor
force participation, with the estimated reduction typically falling between 6 and 12
percent.55 One difficulty with these papers, however, is the required assumption that
spousal health insurance is exogenous to an individual's labor supply decisions. Gruber
and Madrian (1997) overcome this difficulty by exploiting the introduction of
continuation of coverage mandates. These state and federal laws require that employers
offer employees the opportunity to continue to purchase health insurance through the
employer's plan for up to 18 months after leaving the job.56 Gruber and Madrian find
that these mandates reduce labor force participation by around 15 percent.
Studies that have examined the impact of public insurance on labor supply
choices have, thus far, focused on the Medicaid program.57 The results of this literature
are mixed, but in general seem to indicate that for low-income single mothers, the
availability of public health care does not have much impact on labor supply. There are a
number of difficulties with these studies however, and they cannot clearly identify the
potential effects of other expansions in government health care for a number of reasons.
First, the necessary focus on the Medicaid-eligible population - mainly low-income
single mothers - makes the results less generalizable to other populations. Additionally,
the historical tying of Medicaid benefits to cash welfare programs resulted in a unique
55 e.g. Buchmueller and Valetta (1999), Olson (1998), Schone and Vistnes (2000), Wellington and Cobb-
Clark (2000)
56 The federal law, commonly known as COBRA, was passed in 1986, and requires that individuals be
allowed to purchase 18 months of coverage at the average group rate.
57 For example, Winkler (1991), Moffit and Wolfe (1992), Yelowitz (1995), Yazici (1997), Ham and
Shore-Sheppard (2000)
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incentive system under which it is extremely difficult to disentangle the effects of
Medicaid and welfare.5 8
A number of papers have also studied the impact of employer-provided health
insurance on the retirement decision.59 The majority of these studies suggest a significant
effect of health insurance on retirement. Like the literature examining labor supply
outcomes for prime-aged workers, the retirement literature has struggled with
endogeneity issues. By utilizing continuation of coverage mandates as an exogenous
form of outside health care coverage, Gruber and Madrian (1995, 1996) find that the
retirement hazard increases by 30% when such coverage becomes available.
The COBRA mandates provided the opportunity to study an exogenous change in
outside health insurance coverage, and papers which utilized this control group present
the best evidence to date on the effects of health insurance on labor mobility. Even so,
the continuation of coverage mandates suffer from two particular shortcomings for this
purpose: their relatively short duration and high out-of-pocket costs. The opportunity to
study a separate case of an exogenous health care benefit is therefore important not only
because of the chance to confirm the results from the COBRA studies, but also to obtain
a clearer picture of the magnitude of the effects. Such a case is provided by a radical
change in the health care system of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. As an
added benefit, this case also mimics the expansion of other public health insurance
programs, and therefore provides evidence on the impact of expanding public health care
programs on U.S. labor markets.
58 Beginning in the 1980s, legislation was introduced to weaken the ties between the two programs. In
1996, the replacement of AFDC with TANF fully decoupled welfare and Medicaid.
59 For example, Madrian (1994a), Karoly and Rogowski (1994), Hurd and McGarry (1996), Gustman and
Steinmeier (1994), Rust and Phelan (1997), Blau and Gilleskie (2001).
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3.3 Reforms in the VA Health Care System
Historically, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care system was a
network of hospitals, established over 70 years ago for the purpose of providing specialty
care to veterans with conditions resulting from their military service. Over time, the
system was expanded to also include care for low-income veterans. VA provided mainly
inpatient care, with outpatient services for non-service-connected conditions available
only as follow-up to an inpatient stay.
In 1996, the U.S. government began a major overhaul of this health care system.
In an effort to catch up with progress in private-sector medicine, VA health care began a
shift from an emphasis on hospital-based specialty services to a focus on primary care
and preventive medicine. The total number of patients treated in VA hospitals dropped
44 percent between 1989 and 1999, while the total number of outpatient visits increased
66 percent over the same time period (Klein & Stockford, 2001). In addition to this
change, VA's resource allocation system was redesigned. Following the HMO model,
VA began distributing its health care budget using a capitated, patient-based formula.60
As a result of these changes, VA anticipated that increased efficiency would result
in significant reductions in costs per patient and in necessary staff. With this in mind,
VA felt that it would have the resources available to be accountable to the entire veteran
population. VA therefore changed its rules on eligibility for care. Prior to the reform,
VA guaranteed care only to veterans with service-connected conditions or low incomes;
following the restructuring, all veterans became eligible for VA health care (GAO/T-
60 In a capitated payment system, the health care provider is reimbursed a flat dollar amount for each
patient regardless of the services provided.
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HEHS-99-109). As a result of the changes in the system, VA's patient load increased
from 2.5 million veterans in 1995 to 4.5 million in 2002.
The VA restructuring affects the availability of health care for the entire veteran
population. For non-poor, non-disabled veterans, the policy change constitutes the
introduction of a form of non-employer-provided health insurance that was previously
unavailable. Even for the previously-eligible (i.e., low-income or disabled) segment of
the veteran population, this policy change results in a significant, exogenous change in
health insurance status. The VA system following the reorganization became a health
care provider much more similar to what was available in the private sector. Thus, even
for previous users of VA care, the policy change resulted in the introduction of health
care benefits that are much more substitutable for private care than anything provided
under the old system. We therefore utilize this exogenous introduction of an outside
health insurance option for U.S. veterans to estimate the impact of employer-provided
health insurance on labor supply. More generally, this policy change allows us to
investigate the effects of increasing the scope and availability of public health insurance
programs on individuals' labor supply choices.
3.4 Data and Empirical Model
We use data from the Census Bureau's March Current Population Survey (CPS)
for the years 1992 through 2002. We utilize a difference-in-differences estimation
strategy to compare the labor supply choices of veterans and non-veterans before and
after the restructuring of VA health care. Because of the small number of female
veterans and very young veterans in the data, we restrict our sample to include all
87
surveyed males age 25 and over. The treated population is therefore male veterans age
25 and older, and the control group is male non-veterans over the age of 24. Since
changes in VA health care were implemented throughout 1996 and 1997, we define
1992-1995 as the pre-policy period and 1998-2002 as the post-policy period.
The CPS allows us to study labor market outcomes such as retirement, labor force
exit, and movement into part-time work or self-employment. In addition to information
about employment in the current year, the survey questions individuals about their labor
market participation in the previous year. In order to isolate the effect of the policy
change on individuals' decisions to alter their labor market behavior, we restrict our
sample to those who report working at least one week in the previous year.61 We use a
probit model to estimate the following equation:
(1) yit = 30 + f3iveterani + 32veterani*postt +3 3Xit +8t + Lit
where:
yit = labor supply outcomes including: retired, not working, self-employed,
working part time
veterans = 1 if individual has been honorably discharged from active military duty,
0 otherwise
postt = 1 in the post-policy period, 0 otherwise
Xit = vector of individual characteristics: age, race, marital status, education, and
state dummies, age * veteran dummies, industry and occupation dummies,
and indicators for employer-provided health insurance and pensions
8t = year dummies
and,
pit = a random error term.
61 This strategy is consistent with that used by Gruber and Madrian (1995). We find that restricting our
sample to individuals who report working at least 10 weeks in the previous year produces very similar
results. Regressions on the whole sample (i.e. including individuals that did not work on the previous year)
also produce results that are qualitatively similar, although of smaller magnitude.
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Summary statistics are shown in Table 1. Comparing these statistics for the
veteran and non-veteran populations reveals that the veteran population is older than the
non-veteran population and is aging more rapidly. For this reason, we include an age*
veteran interaction term in the regressions, allowing age to enter separately for the two
populations.6 2 The age difference likely accounts for at least some of the differences in
average characteristics between the two groups. Veterans are more likely to be retired or
not working and more likely to be married.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Effects on Labor Force Participation
We begin by examining the effects of the VA policy change on individuals'
decisions about whether to participate in the labor force. As mentioned above, the
previous literature has found that tying employment to health insurance results in lower
retirement rates and less labor mobility. We therefore expect the public insurance
expansion implemented by VA to result in a lower probability of labor force participation
by veterans.
Table 2 reports results for the labor force participation of both age groups.
Reported coefficients are probit marginal effects. All regressions are reported with and
without controls for characteristics of the employer in the previous year. These
characteristics include dummies for the industry and occupation of employment last year,
as well as indicators for whether the individual received health insurance or a pension
62 One concern with this estimation strategy is the possibility of systematic differences between the
treatment and control groups. For this reason, we have also run all reported regressions including veteran
interaction terms for every control variable. When we allow all controls to enter for veterans and non-
veterans separately, the coefficients on the veteran interactions are typically insignificant, and our
coefficient of interest is virtually unchanged.
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through his employer. Results are similar with and without these controls, although the
magnitude of the coefficient of interest (the coefficient on veteran*post) is generally
slightly smaller when employer characteristics are included.
As expected, results consistently show that individuals are more likely to move
into not working as a result of the VA policy change. As a result of gaining VA
coverage, the probability of working drops by .34 percentage points for a prime-aged
worker with average characteristics and by 2.43 percentage points for the average older
worker. Relative to the pre-period veteran averages for these two groups, this is about a
4% increase in the probability that a prime-aged worker leaves employment, and a 10%
increase in the probability that an older worker ceases work. The introduction of the VA
health care benefit increases the probability of entering retirement for older workers by
.38 percentage points, a 2.3% increase relative to the pre-period veteran average. While
the magnitudes of these estimates are not particularly large, this is likely in part because
while we measure the effect on the entire veteran population, only about a quarter of U.S.
veterans actually enrolled in the VA system during our study period.63 The effects are
therefore likely to be diluted by the large number of veteran non-users, some of whom
may have been unaware of their eligibility to use the VA system.
The results in Table 2 demonstrate a clear relationship between employer-
provided health insurance and the choice to participate in the labor market. They also
indicate that expanding public insurance programs is likely to lead to earlier retirements
63 Any veteran wishing to use VA care must first sign-up for benefits or "enroll" in the system. During our
study period, some veterans enrolled but did not actually subsequently use VA care. The fact that these
individuals enrolled indicates awareness of their eligibility and a potential desire to access the system at a
later point in time. It is not clear what proportions of unenrolled veterans are unaware of their eligibility,
not interested in ever using VA care, or relying on the option of enrolling at a later date should they desire
VA care.
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and more labor mobility. We next turn to estimating the effect of health insurance on job
choice, by examining movements into self-employment and part-time work.
3.5.2 Effects on Job Choice
Because self-employed workers face much higher insurance costs than those
whose insurance is employer-provided and purchased in a group market, individuals who
may otherwise wish to move into self-employment may be reluctant to leave jobs with
employer-provided insurance. A small number of papers have examined whether this is
in fact the case, although the results have been mixed. Holtz-Eakin, Penrod and Rosen
(1996) find no effect of employer-provided health insurance on the probability of moving
from employment into self-employment, but Madrian and Lefgren (1998) find some
evidence that the availability of outside coverage increases movement into self-
employment. As reported in Table 3, we find that for prime-aged workers, the
probability that the average veteran is self-employed increases by .14 percentage points,
an increase of 3.2% relative to the pre-period mean for veterans in this age group.
Therefore, as expected, it appears that individuals in this age group are more willing to
move into self-employment once relinquishing employer-provided health insurance no
longer implies paying high insurance costs out of pocket. At the same time, the sign on
the coefficient of interest for older workers is the opposite of expected and, when controls
are included for employer characteristics last year, highly significant. Thus, it appears
that as a result of the policy change, the average veteran between the ages of 55 and 64 is
actually less likely to become self-employed. One possibility is that individuals in this
age group were previously using self-employment as a bridge to retirement, so that they
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could continue to afford medical care expenses until becoming Medicare-eligible at age
65. Since the rate of retirement increases for this group as a result of the policy change, a
potential explanation for these unexpected results could be a substitution of early
retirement for self-employment.
In addition to studying the impact of public insurance availability on the
probability of self-employment, we also examine the effects of insurance on part-time
work. Because most part-time jobs do not provide workers with benefits such as health
insurance, workers who place a high value on these benefits may avoid moving into part-
time work in order to maintain their health insurance coverage. In surveys, older workers
often state that they would prefer to transition into retirement by moving first to part-time
employment (Abraham & Houseman 2004). If moving to part-time work means losing
health insurance, however, older workers may be reluctant to do so. COBRA may aid in
such transitions for individuals within 18 months of attaining Medicare coverage, but
COBRA will still not alleviate the full extent of job lock, both because of its high out-of-
pocket costs and limited duration. The literature examining the labor supply decisions of
prime-aged, married women tests the impact of spousal coverage on the decision to work
part time. As mentioned earlier, however, these tests suffer from potential endogeneity
bias, since the labor supply decision by husbands and wives is likely to be a joint
consideration. Buchmueller and Valletta (1999) find that spousal insurance increases the
probability of working in a part-time job by 2.8 to 3.3 percentage points.
Table 4 reports our estimates of the impact of employer-provided insurance on the
probability of working part-time. In these regressions, the sample is restricted to
individuals employed in the current year. Controls for employer characteristics are
92
therefore current year controls (as opposed to controls for the previous year, as in the
regressions discussed previously). Additionally, we control for whether an employer
offers pensions and health insurance, as opposed to whether an individual receives such
benefits, because of the fact that many individuals may lose these benefits if they move
from full-time to part-time work. As predicted, we find that the average veteran is more
likely to work part-time as a result of gaining outside health insurance coverage. For
older workers, we estimate a 1.2 percentage point increase in the probability of working
part-time, which is a 6.6% increase relative to the pre-period veteran average. Our result
for prime-aged workers is also positive and highly significant, but considerably smaller.
This result is not surprising, however, since the sample is restricted to men. While the
previous literature has found fairly large effects for married women, these individuals are
also typically found to have a higher elasticity of labor supply than males. Since prime-
aged men are less likely to be secondary earners than prime-aged women, it therefore
makes sense that they would be less likely to work part time.
3.5.3 Which Veterans Are Affected?
The previous results consider the effects of the VA policy change on the labor
supply of all veterans in particular age groups. We now turn to examining the effects on
specific segments of the veteran population, to investigate whether certain groups of
veterans are impacted differentially. We test for differences in the impact on low-income
and high-income veterans, married and single veterans, and veterans with and without
employer-provided health insurance.
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As discussed above, certain veterans were eligible for VA health care prior to the
policy change. Previously-eligibles (those with service-connected disabilities or low
incomes) still have the potential to be affected by the change, since the types of health
services available became much more comparable to those covered by employer-
provided health insurance. Even so, we would expect to see stronger effects of the policy
change on newly-eligible veterans, who go from having no outside insurance to full
coverage under the public program. In Table 5, we report results for regressions run on
individuals whose household income in the previous year was above or below the VA-
established means test cutoffs. All regressions include controls for employer
characteristics. There appears to be no effect for low-income veterans on the probability
of transitioning to not working, while the effect is strong and positive for higher-income
individuals. At the same time, however, 55 to 64 year old veterans in both groups are
significantly more likely to retire as a result of the policy change, and the magnitude of
the effect is not significantly different across the two groups. Effects on the probability
of moving into self-employment or working part-time are similar in most cases for low-
and high-income veterans. One exception is that prime-aged low-income veterans are
much more likely to move into part-time work as a result of the policy change than their
wealthier counterparts, a difference which is significant at the 6% level. This could be, in
part, because these individuals are more likely to be disabled, and to therefore desire
shorter work hours once they do not need to rely on their employer for insurance.
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Table 6 reports results for married and single veterans. VA health care covers
only the veteran and not the veteran's spouse or dependents.64 For this reason, married
veterans may still be job-locked if their spouse depends on health insurance provided
65through the veteran's employer.6 5 We therefore expect to find stronger effects of the
availability of this public insurance on single veterans than married. As reported in the
table, however, this is not always the case. Married veterans are significantly more likely
to move into not working or retirement than single veterans. These effects are large,
positive and highly significant for married veterans, while the coefficients on
veteran*post are insignificant for singles when the outcome is not working, and become
significant and negative (although very small) for the retired outcome. The effect of the
policy change on the probability of being self-employed is not significantly different
across the two groups at either age. Married and single prime-aged workers are also
equally likely to move into part-time work, but effects on this outcome are very different
for married and single workers approaching the normal retirement age. For older,
married workers, the probability of working part time increases by 1.7 percentage points
as a result of the policy change. Older, single workers on the other hand, are significantly
less likely to be working part time. The probability that these workers hold part-time
positions drops by 1.83 percentage points.
The single versus married results are puzzling but have several possible
explanations. One factor of importance may be the relationship between marital status
64 In cases where the veteran is catastrophically disabled or dies as a result of military service, the spouse
and other dependents do become eligible for VA care under the CHAMPVA program. This is not relevant
in our study, however, as catastrophically disabled veterans will not be in the work force.
65 It is important to note, however, that a substantial number of married veterans in our sample have
working spouses who are more likely to have their own health insurance coverage. Approximately 74% of
prime-aged veterans and 57% of older veterans in the sample have wives who are employed.
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and household income. As these characteristics are likely to be highly correlated, we
may be picking up effects that are not directly related to marital status but rather to
wealth. Single veterans may also differ systematically from married veterans according
to other unobservable characteristics. For example, these individuals may have different
tastes for work than married veterans who are more likely to have families (Coile 2003).
Finally, we cut our sample by individuals who had employer-provided health
insurance last year and those that did not. For individuals without employer-provided
health insurance, there are not the same potential job-lock effects as for those who have
this benefit. At the same time, individuals without group coverage through an employer
are still indirectly affected by the U.S. convention of tying insurance to employment, as
they pay higher costs to insure out-of-pocket in the individual market than their
counterparts with group insurance. Workers without employer-provided insurance may
alter their labor supply choices when they become eligible for VA care, because they no
longer need to work as much in order to pay for health insurance or out-of-pocket
medical expenses. Thus, eligibility for public health insurance may still affect
employment behavior for individuals without employer-provided coverage, even though
this is not the same job-lock effect typically examined in the literature. It is therefore not
clear, a priori, whether to expect significantly different effects across the two insurance
status groups.
Table 7 reports results by employer-provided health insurance status in the
previous year. For older workers, there is not a statistically significant difference by
insurance status in the probability of moving into retirement or not working. There is
also no significant difference across the two groups of older workers in the probability of
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being self-employed. Older workers without employer-provided health insurance are,
however, significantly more likely to be working part-time as a result of the policy
change than older workers with a health insurance benefit. For the insured group, the
coefficient on post*vet is positive but small and insignificant for the self-employed
outcome, while this same coefficient is large, positive, and highly significant for the
group without employer-provided health insurance.
For prime-aged workers, there do appear to be differential effects by employer-
provided insurance status on both not working and self-employment. The probability that
workers in this age group are not working increases by 2 percentage points for those
without employer provided insurance, but does not change significantly for those with
insurance coverage through their jobs. Workers without insurance coverage are more
likely to be self-employed as a result of gaining VA coverage - this probability increases
by .2 percentage points. For those with insurance, this coefficient is positive but is
extremely small and not highly significant. Finally, for prime-aged workers, there is an
increase in the probability of working part-time as a result of the policy change, and this
effect is not significantly different by insurance status. It therefore appears overall that
the effects of gaining public insurance on labor supply are at least as strong if not
stronger for those with no previous insurance coverage through an employer as for those
who do have coverage from their place of employment. These results must be interpreted
with caution, however, because of potential selection issues. Workers who remain in jobs
with health insurance may be less sensitive to the incentives from the policy change than
those that do not. For this reason, it would be more ideal to cut the sample according to
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health insurance status prior to 1996. Since this information is not available, however,
we are only able to base our samples on health insurance status in the previous year.
3.6 Concluding Comments
This paper demonstrates a strong relationship between health insurance and labor
supply choices. As with the literature that examines the introduction of COBRA and
other continuation of coverage mandates, we utilize an exogenous change in outside
health insurance status to show that tying health insurance to employment reduces job
mobility, resulting in potential inefficiencies in the labor market. By utilizing a major
organizational change in VA health care, we are also able to estimate the effects of
expanding public health insurance availability on labor supply choices.
Our results demonstrate a significant effect of public health insurance on work
decisions. We find particularly strong results for those workers in the 55-64 year old age
group, who are approaching the normal retirement age. For this age group, our results
suggest a positive and significant increase in early retirement with the availability of
outside health care coverage. Our effects appear smaller than those found by Gruber and
Madrian (1995), which is likely at least partially explained by the different populations
considered by the two studies.66 In addition, our results can generally be considered to be
a lower bound on the effects of other public insurance expansions on labor supply,
because while the VA expansion potentially extends benefits to a huge population of
individuals, only about 25% of eligibles expressed an interest in using the program during
our study period.
66 Because they are estimating the effects of continuation of coverage mandates, Gruber and Madrian
restrict their sample to individuals with employer-provided health insurance in the previous period.
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For veterans in both age groups, effects on labor force participation appear
slightly stronger for higher-income indivduals who are more likely to be newly-eligible
for VA care. Effects also appear somewhat stronger for married than for single veterans.
Finally, the availability of public insurance affects labor supply choices of individuals
with and without employer provided health care coverage.
Overall, our study confirms the job-lock effects of tying health insurance to
employment, and suggests that public health insurance expansions have the potential to
alleviate some of the reductions in job mobility caused by this type of health insurance
regime. While the magnitudes of our results are relatively small, they are likely diluted
because we consider the impact on the labor supply of all veterans, many of whom may
never consider using the VA program. This evidence therefore suggests even larger
potential for the alleviation ofjob-lock through publicly provided health care.
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Table 1A. Summary Statistics, CPS 1992-2002
(Sample restricted to men between 55 and 64 e
Veterans
Pre
(N=7775)
age 59.365
married
white
no hs
hs
some coil
coil grad
grad sch
pension plan
included in pen plan
inc. in emp HI plan
Northeast
Midwest
South
West
0.813
0.927
0.142
0.352
0.240
0.160
0.106
Post
(N=8242)
58.843
0.804
0.907
0.062
0.352
0.294
0.171
0.120
0.480
0.429
0.628
0.236
0.257
0.286
0.222
0.545
0.487
0.653
0.219
0.247
0.278
0.257
'mployed last year)
Non-Veterans
Pre Post
(N=6258) (N=10820)
58.480
0.803
0.845
0.294
0.310
0.151
0.112
0.133
0.448
0.403
0.583
0.259
0.246
0.292
0.204
58.662
0.791
0.844
0.209
0.298
0.178
0.152
0.163
0.490
0.439
0.596
0.226
0.231
0.303
0.240
not working
part timelemployed*
retired* *
self-employed
Occupations:
prof/manag
tech/sales/clerical
service
farming
craftsman
operator
Industries:
agriculture/mining
construction
manufacturing
transport/commun
trade
financial/real estate
business/repair
personal
public
professional
0.251
0.182
0.163
0.039
0.224
0.175
0.148
0.040
0.254
0.175
0.065
0.041
0.135
0.136
0.045
0.068
0.159
0.078
0.136
0.050
0.045
0.033
0.052
0.139
0.267
0.174
0.069
0.030
0.140
0.127
0.034
0.071
0.145
0.098
0.125
0.053
0.051
0.028
0.066
0.134
0.227
0.171
0.119
0.033
0.249
0.143
0.082
0.058
0.132
0.163
0.060
0.079
0.181
0.064
0.149
0.046
0.045
0.031
0.032
0.140
0.199
0.155
0.107
0.039
0.288
0.139
0.077
0.048
0.127
0.151
0.053
0.082
0.149
0.067
0.131
0.050
0.055
0.038
0.033
0.173
*Part-time statistics are based on being currently employed. There are 3712 observations for pre-
veterans, 8181 post-veterans, 3407 pre-non-veterans, and 11225 post-non-veterans.
** Number of observations for Retired is 3678 for pre-veterans and 3233 for pre-non-veterans, because
variable does not exist for 1992-1993.
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Table B. Summary Statistics, CPS 1992-2002
(Sample restricted to men between 25 and 51 e
Veterans
Pre
(N=19091)
age 41.507
married
white
no hs
hs
some coil
coll grad
grad sch
pension plan
included in pen plan
inc. in emp HI plan
Northeast
Midwest
South
West
0.699
0.884
0.047
0.379
0.355
0.144
0.075
0.615
0.536
0.647
0.197
0.249
0.308
0.246
Post
(N=16199)
41.395
0.669
0.845
0.033
0.371
0.396
0.142
0.057
0.662
0.566
0.673
0.169
0.248
0.317
0.266
mployed last year)
Non-Veterans
Pre Post
(N=74844) (N=99620)
36.091
0.630
0.865
0.131
0.326
0.246
0.198
0.099
0.537
0.453
0.612
0.242
0.240
0.286
0.232
37.683
0.627
0.859
0.125
0.321
0.256
0.206
0.092
0.580
0.495
0.626
0.212
0.241
0.284
0.264
not working
part timelemployed*
retired* *
self-employed
Occupations:
prof/manag
tech/sales/clerical
service
farming
craftsman
operator
Industries:
agriculture/mining
construction
manufacturing
transport/commun
trade
financial/real estate
business/repair
personal
public
professional
0.092
0.116
0.005
0.044
0.082
0.104
0.005
0.043
0.241
0.202
0.095
0.023
0.208
0.189
0.237
0.185
0.102
0.018
0.218
0.189
0.033
0.098
0.204
0.135
0.144
0.040
0.064
0.026
0.095
0.121
0.028
0.106
0.187
0.140
0.138
0.037
0.073
0.031
0.093
0.117
0.080
0.117
0.001
0.037
0.271
0.192
0.086
0.040
0.190
0.190
0.049
0.111
0.207
0.085
0.183
0.048
0.066
0.036
0.045
0.139
0.064
0.106
0.002
0.032
0.289
0.177
0.087
0.036
0.194
0.182
0.044
0.123
0.185
0.089
0.180
0.049
0.079
0.038
0.044
0.133
*Part-time statistics are based on being currently employed. There are 9393 observations for pre-
veterans, 17040 post-veterans, 40197 pre-non-veterans, and 109688 post-non-veterans.
** Retired information is not available for 1992 and 1993. Therefore there are 8948 veterans and
37064 non-veterans in the pre-period.
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